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Judicial Review of
Jeopardy Tax Collection:
Sentence First,
Verdict Afterwards*
Charles H. Gustafsont
The Internal Revenue Service's jeopardy and termination powers, cou-
pled with the Anti-Injunction Act, give the Service almost uncontrolled dis-
cretion to seize taxpayer's property to assure tax collection. Recently, these
powers have been used to further the accomplishment of non-revenue-
collection goals such as drug enforcement. The author traces the history
of the powers and the judicial vacillation on the reviewability of Service ac-
tion. Acknowledging the legitimate intent of the Service, the author sug-
gests several approaches the Supreme Court might take in deciding three
cases presently before it which deal with the difficult questions of judicial
review of the Service's power.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE TAX COLLECTION PROCESS was in other times but one
aspect of the Crown's activities that could not be subjected to
suit. While the scope of sovereign immunity has been modified
substantially by time and practice in the United States, the federal
tax collector has resisted these changes and, to a large degree, has
been able to withstand the trend toward judicial reviewability of gov-
ernmental action. Such an anomaly stems directly from the remark-
able longevity of the dogma that revenue collection by government is
so fundamentally necessary to the continuing operation of govern-
mental activities that judicial intervention in the collection process
cannot be tolerated. While the origins of this dogma predate the Re-
public, the dogma was affirmatively reiterated by Congress during
the period immediately following the Civil War as part of the first
t Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.S. (1959),
University of Buffalo; J.D. (1962), University of Chicago. Admitted to the New York
and District of Columbia Bars.
* This procedural formulation, when originally pronounced, induced the following
immediate criticism: "STUFF AND NONSENSE!" The procedure was, however,
highly efficient, and there is no indication that the criticism affected the Crown's de-
termination to use it.
1. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272, 277 (1855). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 519 (P. Ford ed. 1898)
(A. Hamilton): "The judiciary . . .has no influence over either the sword or the
purse."
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federal income tax law2 and has been a part of the federal taxing stat-
ute ever since. This tenet has been uttered again and again during
this century by various courts from whom taxpayers have sought ju-
dicial relief from the powers of the Internal Revenue Service.3
The government's summary power was reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court in a 1972 decision recognizing that constitutional infirmities
may attend governmental takings of property without opportunity for
prior judicial review,4 and it was the basis of the Court's refusal to
enjoin the Internal Revenue Service's revocation of the tax-exempt
status of a university 5 and of a nonprofit, educational corporation.
6
The application of old rules is not surprising, even when the old
rules are based upon considerations that have, in other areas, been
abandoned or rejected. In this instance, however, the viability of
the dogma is being subjected to further test. During its 1975 Term,
the Supreme Court will hear three cases which will test the outer lim-
its of the unreviewable collection powers of the Internal Revenue
Service and which should elicit guidance with respect to the nature
of any review which may be permissible.7 At the same time, the
Congress has been urged to consider legislation that would assure ju-
dicial review of jeopardy collections.!
Denial of prior review is likely to affect taxpayers most dramatic-
ally where the tax collector exercises broad discretionary powers.
It is not, therefore, surprising that the new strains on the old rule de-
rive from the implementation of the extraordinary collection powers
available to the Internal Revenue Service in jeopardy situations.9
Those powers are very broad. They may be invoked when an officer
of the Service determines that the collection of taxes is in jeopardy.
There are no meaningful statutory guidelines for making such deter-
minations. Accordingly, the risks of abuse are peculiarly high, and
the need for wisdom in the exercise of the power is great. The
2. "[A]nd no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of
any tax shall be maintained in any court." Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 10.
3. See Enochs v. Williams, 370 U.S. 1 (1962); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283
U.S. 589 (1931).
4. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91-92 (1972).
5. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
6. Alexander v. "Americans United," Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974).
7. Shapiro v. Secretary of State, 499 F.2d 527 (D.D.C. 1974), cert. granted sub
nom. Commissioner v. Shapiro, 420 U.S. 923 (1975) (No. 74-744); Laing v. United
States, 496 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 419 U.S. 824 (1974) (No. 73-1808);
United States v. Hall, 493 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 419 U.S. 824 (1974)
(No. 74-75).
8. See, e.g., Hearings on Internal Revenue Service- Taxpayer Assistance and
Compliance Programs Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974).
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6851(a).
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appearance of a lack of wisdom and possible abuse of the Service's
extensive authority has, during the last decade, led a number of fed-
eral district courts and courts of appeals to find avenues for providing
prior judicial review of jeopardy collection actions despite the ap-
parently unassailable doctrine of nonreviewability.
The evolution of circumstances leading to the Supreme Court's
present focus on the extent of judicial review in jeopardy situations
is attributable largely to a decision by the executive branch to use the
broad discretionary powers created for tax collection to thwart those
suspected of engaging in illegal drug traffic.' 0 It is not uncommon for
new law to develop from new and different applications of an estab-
lished legal mechanism. This may become such an instance. The
old dogma was derived from one set of judgments based upon the
importance of public finance; it will now be tested from a different
perspective because of the new uses to which it has been put by the
Internal Revenue Service. It is not without irony that the Internal
Revenue Service, wishing understandably to preserve its unfettered
powers, is asking the Supreme Court to make the old leap of faith
again. But this time the chasm has been widened by the Service's
use of its expansive collection powers to assist other agencies in
making matters difficult for suspected drug dealers. The Court can-
not determine that the old imperatives survive intact without first
confronting the consequences of vesting vast uncontrolled collection
powers in the federal tax collector in a context where the extent of
the government's power and the vulnerability of the lone taxpayer
are partictilarly evident. If the Court concludes that no meaningful
prior review is possible in jeopardy collections, efforts to modify the
statutory powers of the Internal Revenue Service are likely to be re-
doubled.
There follows a brief description of the normal collection powers
vested in the Internal Revenue Service and the special jeopardy
powers, an examination of the use of jeopardy collection powers
for criminal enforcement generally and in cases pending before the
Supreme Court specifically, and an analysis of the issues of judicial
review which the Court is being asked to decide. The article con-
cludes with some observations about proposals for legislative modifi-
cation of the special jeopardy collection powers.
II. THE NORMAL (NON-JEOPARDY) COLLECTION PROCESS
The principal consequence of the use of jeopardy powers by the
Internal Revenue Service is an acceleration of the collection process.
10. See note 106 infra.
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An analysis of the issues now being posed to the Supreme Court
must begin, therefore, with a review of the elements of the normal
collection process and the impact of the jeopardy provisions.
Voluntary taxpayer compliance is the primary source of tax rev-
enues in the United States. Such voluntary compliance is encour-
aged, however, by the arsenal of collection powers available to the
Service in the event that a federal tax liability is not paid.
The beginning of nonvoluntary collection activities by the Ser-
vice is the issuance of an "assessment" of taxes owed against a
particular taxpayer." Federal income tax assessments may result,
in some cases, from arithmetic errors in the returns filed by the tax-
payer. Such errors are normally discovered during the first check of
the income tax return upon which an Assessment Certificate is im-
mediately issued.' 2  Other income tax assessments arise from Ser-
vice decisions, during the audit process, that substantive errors have
been made by the taxpayer in the preparation of his return. If the
Service auditor believes that such mistakes have been made, a
Report of Examination is sent to the taxpayer, along with a form
signifying the taxpayer's agreement with the Service's proposed ad-
justments.' 3 If the taxpayer does not agree with the Service's con-
clusions, he is advised of his entitlement to a conference with Ser-
vice representatives to discuss their differences.'
4
If no agreement is reached, because of an unsuccessful confer-
ence or the failure of the taxpayer to respond to the original report,
a potential "deficiency" exists. 5  Such a deficiency, however, nor-
mally may not result in an assessment until a "notice of deficiency"
(generally known as a "90-day letter") is sent by certified or registered
mail to the taxpayer16
A taxpayer who has received his 90-day letter has several options.
First, he may pay the tax and end the matter. Second, he may pay
the alleged deficiency and sue for a refund in the United States dis-
11. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 6201-04.
12. I.R.S. Form 23-C.
13. Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Manual § 4430.
14. Id. § 4432-2.
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 621 1(a) defines "deficiency" as
[I]he amount by which the tax imposed . . . exceeds the excess of-
(1) the sum of
(A) the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return,
if a return was made by the taxpayer and an amount was shown
as the tax by the taxpayer thereon, plus
(B) the amounts previously assessed (or collected without assess-
ment) as a deficiency, over-
(2) the amount of rebates . . . made.
16. Id. § 6212.
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trict court or the Court of Claims. Finally, the taxpayer may choose
to defer payment of the amount demanded and petition the Tax
Court for a redetermination of the deficiency.
The Tax Court option must be selected within a 90-day period
initiated by receipt of the deficiency notice.1 7 The notice of defi-
ciency has, therefore, been described repeatedly as the "ticket to the
Tax Court."'18 During the 90 days, no collection activity may be under-
taken by the Service,' 9 nor may an assessment be made against the
taxpayer.2 ° If a petition is made to the Tax Court, the Service is
precluded from issuing an assessment or taking collection action un-
til the Tax Court determination has been made. If the taxpayer
does not petition the Tax Court2 2 or if the Tax Court determines that
a deficiency exists, 23 an assessment may be made by the Service.
24
The imposition of an assessment, by whatever means, is the statu-
tory precondition for use of the Service's broad powers of collection.
Section 6321 of the Code creates a lien in favor of the United States
in the amount of any tax which the taxpayer "neglects or refuses to
pay . . .after demand. 25  The lien also applies to interest, addi-
tional amounts, additions to tax, assessable penalties, and any costs
that may accrue with respect to these liabilities.26 Although the lien
arises when the assessment is made, 7 collection activity may not be
taken by the Service during the ten days following receipt by the tax-
payer of the notice of assessment.28 The lien continues in effect until
the liability is satisfied or until it becomes unenforcible because of
lapse of time.29
The Government's tax lien is very broad. It attaches to "all prop-
erty and rights to property, whether real or personal. 30  Further,
it applies even to property acquired by the taxpayer after the time
when the original lien arises.3' Once the lien is filed in the manner
directed by the Code, the Government has a claim to the taxpayer's
17. Id. § 6213(a).
18. Corbett v. Frank, 293 F.2d 501, 502 (9tlf Cir. 1961).
19. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6213(a).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22: Id. § 6213(c).
23. Id. § 6214(a).
24. Id. § 6322.
25. Id. § 6321.
26. Id.
27. Id. § 6322.
28. Id. § 6331(a).
29. Id. § 6322.
30. Id. § 6321.
31. Treas. Reg. § 301.6321-1 (1971).
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assets which is prior to all but a few specifically enumerated compet-
ing claimants.32
The establishment of the lien against the taxpayer's properties
and property rights enables the Service to seize properties in the pos-
session of the taxpayer or to levy against properties or property rights
in the possession of others. Summary distraint powers established
by the Code are exercisable without resort to court order and have,
therefore, almost completely replaced the use of judicial proceedirgs
by the Service for purposes of tax collection.33
The Code provides that forcible collections may be used when,
ten days after notice to the taxpayer of the amount owed, the liability
has not been satisfied due to the "neglect or refusal" of the taxpayer.34
The Internal Revenue Manual indicates, however, that the taxpayer
should be given "a reasonable chance to settle voluntarily" and pro-
vides that a series of notices be sent to the taxpayer before a levy or
seizure action is taken.35  This policy generally permits several
months to pass after assessment before any forcible action is taken to
collect the tax.36
Even these normal nonsummary collection powers of the Service
are substantial. Operating with a very high priority among creditors,
the Service can effectively terminate a taxpayer's income producing
32. Section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 sets forth a list of credi-
tors whose competing interests have been protected in whole or part from the impact
of the federal tax lien. The priority of the government's lien was diminished by the
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 26, 28 U.S.C.), which enlarged the protection for competing in-
terests. The position of the government, however, is a source of continuing concern
among segments of the business community adversely affected by the high priority
of the tax creditor. Suggestions for the further reduction of the government's pri-
ority may be found regularly in legal periodicals. See, e.g., Babitt & Freiman, The
Priority of Federal Claims: Selected Problems and Theoretical Considerations, 24
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 521 (1973); Olsen, The Appropriation of Deposits for Debts:
Levies, Liens and Setoffs, 90 BANKING L.J. 827 (1973); Plumb, The Relative Priority
of Federal and Business Claims: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 27 Bus. LAWYER
1195 (1972); Comment, The Superpriority of a Possessing Lien Under Federal Tax
Lien Act of 1966, 4 CREIGHTON L. REv. 146 (1970).
33. Summary distraint powers were created at the time of the first federal in-
come tax laws. Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9. The federal revenue agency has,
however, always had the alternative of initiating a court action to collect from de-
linquent taxpayers. In connection with such collection suits, the court could be asked
to exercise its powers of attachment in aid of the tax creditor. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 7403; see G. HOLMES, FEDERAL INCOME AND PROFITS TAXES (1919).
34. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6331.
35. Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Manual § 5311(3) (May 16, 1975).
36. The Internal Revenue Manual directs a collection officer to advise a taxpayer
"specifically" of a contemplated levy or seizure and to give the taxpayer an oppor-
tunity to pay voluntarily before the action is taken. Id. §§ 5311(4) et seq. Written
notice of a proposal action is required in some circumstances. Id. § 5311(6).
[Vol. 26:315
JEOPARDY TAX COLLECTION
activity by seizing his business assets. Use of these powers may
cause an employee to lose his job because "the Government" has gar-
nished his wages. An asset can be seized and disposed of in a forced
sale which is unlikely to result in the recovery of the fair market value
of the asset, let alone the value of the asset to the taxpayer. Extra-
ordinary degrees of discretionary authority are vested in Internal
Revenue Service employees, even in these normal collection activi-
ties. The timing of decisions to file notices of lien, to levy or to seize,
and the method of conducting a forced sale are all left to administra-
tive discretion. Little guidance is provided for the exercise of that
discretion.37
Despite the vastness of the collection powers and the arbitrari-
ness with which those powers may be exercised, there are some ele-
ments of the process which afford a taxpayer an opportunity to pro-
tect his interests. He has previously received a 30-day letter and has
had an opportunity for at least one conference with Service employ-
ees. The taxpayer has also received a 90-day deficiency letter and
has been advised of his opportunity to take his case to the Tax Court.
After these steps have been completed he is entitled by law to a ten-
day notice before distraint actions are taken; and in actuality, under
Service practice, he is likely to have received several additional warn-
ings of the imminence of forcible collection measures. 38 These var-
ious steps tend to mitigate the harshness of the collection process by
affording opportunities to prevent mistakes and effect settlement.
No such steps are prescribed, however, where jeopardy collection
power is exercised.39
III. THE COLLECTION PROCESS-
JEOPARDY SITUATIONS
Sections 685140 and 686141 of the Code define two situations in
which the Service is empowered to undertake forcible collection ac-
37. The Manual does, however, counsel the collection officer that "j]udicious use
of the levy authority is important to both the taxpayer and the Service." Id.
§ 5311(9).
38. See generally id. § 5311(3), which states that reasonable chance for volun-
tary settlement should be given "except in jeopardy cases."
39. Id.
40. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6851: TERMINATION OF TAXABLE YEAR.
(a) INCOME TAX IN JEOPARDY-
(1) IN GENERAL-If the Secretary or his delegate finds that a taxpayer
designs quickly to depart from the United States or to remove his property
therefrom, or to conceal himself or his property therein, or to do any other
act tending to prejudice or to render wholly or partly ineffectual proceedings
to collect the income tax for the current or the preceding taxable year unless
such proceedings be brought without delay, the Secretary or his delegate
1976]
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tivity without pursuing the relatively measured process followed in
normal collection actions. While the two situations are defined dif-
ferently and give rise to somewhat different consequences, in each
the authority can only arise when the "Secretary or his delegate" de-
termines that the collection of tax is in jeopardy. The language of
the Code suggests that the two situations constitute varying degrees
of risk to the collection process. In the jeopardy assessment provi-
sion, the risk derives merely by the passage of time; in the termina-
tion provision, the risk is created by the intentional conduct of
the taxpayer. Section 6861 authorizes a jeopardy assessment where
the "Secretary or his delegate believes that the assessment or collec-
tion of a deficiency . . . will be jeopardized by delay." Section 6851
authorizes a termination of the taxable year and provides that the tax
for such year shall be "immediately due and payable" where:
the Secretary or his delegate finds that a taxpayer
designs quickly to depart from the United States or to re-
move his property therefrom, or to conceal himself or his
property therein, or to do any other act tending to prejudice
or to render wholly or partly ineffectual proceedings to
collect the income tax for the current or preceding taxable
year.
The jeopardy assessment provisions of section 6861 do not de-
pend upon some intentional misconduct of the taxpayer. The Ser-
vice need only "believe" that "the assessment or collection of a de-
ficiency . . . will be jeopardized by delay." When such a belief
is held, the Service is entitled immediately to assess the deficiency
shall declare the taxable period for such taxpayer immediately terminated,
and shall cause notice of such finding and declaration to be given the
taxpayer, together with a demand for immediate payment of the tax for the
taxable period so declared terminated and of the tax for the preceding
taxable year or so much of such tax as is unpaid, whether or not the time
otherwise allowed by law for filing return and paying the tax has expired;
and such taxes shall thereupon become immediately due and payable. In
any proceeding in court brought to enforce payment of taxes made due and
payable by virtue of the provisions of this section, the finding of the
Secretary or his delegate, made as herein provided, whether made after
notice to the taxpayer or not, shall be for all purposes presumptive evidence
of jeopardy.
41. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6861:
JEOPARDY ASSESSMENTS OF INCOME, ESTATE, AND GIFT TAXES
(a) AUTHORITY FOR MAKING-If the Secretary or his delegate believes
that the assessment or collection of a deficiency, as defined in section 6211,
will be jeopardized by delay, he shall, notwithstanding the provisions of
section 6213(a), immediately assess such deficiency (together with all in-
terest, additional amounts, and additions to the tax provided for by law),
and notice and demand shall be made by the Secretary or his delegate for
the payment thereof.
42. Authority to approve jeopardy assessment actions has been delegated to
the district director. Treas. Reg. § 301.6861-1(a) (1961).
[Vol. 26:315
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and is directed to make notice and demand for payment.4 3 When the
jeopardy assessment is made, the Government's lien against the
assets of the taxpayer is created and the usual collection mechanisms
become available.44 Because of the risks perceived by the Service,
however, forcible collection actions may be taken immediately upon
assessment, notice and demand "without regard" to the usual ten
days after notice and demand.45
Where a jeopardy assessment is made under section 6861, collec-
tion action may be taken without sending a 30-day letter, without
conferring with the taxpayer, and without sending a 90-day letter.46
But section 6861(b) requires that a deficiency notice be sent within
60 days after the jeopardy assessment in situations where no prior
notice was given.47 Accordingly, the taxpayer subjected to a jeop-
ardy assessment eventually receives his ticket to the Tax Court
and may, therefore, petition the Tax Court for review of the alleged
deficiency despite the fact that an assessment has already been made.
In a jeopardy assessment situation, the Service's collection au-
thority is not automatically suspended during the Tax Court's con-
sideration of the matter. Pursuant to the provisions of section 6863,
the taxpayer is entitled to a stay of collection actions if he files a
bond equal to the amount as to which a stay is sought.4  In addi-
43. Section 6861(a) provides that the Service "shall . . . immediately assess"
a deficiency when it holds the requisite "belief" in the risks of delay. At one point
the Service was so concerned with the mandatory language of that provision that it
questioned its own authority to abate the assessment if its original judgment of the
risks was found to be in error. Section 6861(g) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 was, therefore, enacted to make it clear that the Service could abate the jeop-
ardy assessment if it "finds that the jeopardy does not exist."
44. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6322.
45. Id. § 6331(a).
46. Id. § 6861(a).
47. Id. § 6861(b).
48. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6863: STAY OF COLLECTION OF JEOPARDY AssEss-
MENTS.
(a) BOND TO STAY COLLEcTION.-When a jeopardy assessment has been
made under section 6861 or 6862, the collection of the whole or any amount
of such assessment may be stayed by filing with the Secretary or his dele-
gate, within such time as may be fixed by regulations prescribed by the
Secretary or his delegate, a bond in an amount equal to the amount as to
which the stay is desired, conditioned upon the payment of the amount
(together with interest thereon) the collection of which is stayed, at the
time at which, but for the making of the jeopardy assessment, such amount
would be due. Upon the filing of the bond the collection of so much of the
amount assessed as is covered by the bond shall be stayed. The taxpayer
shall have the right to waive such stay at any time in respect of the whole
or any part of the amount covered by the bond, and if as a result of such
waiver any part of the amount covered by the bond is paid, then the bond
shall, at the request of the taxpayer, be proportionately reduced. If any
portion of the jeopardy assessment is abated, the bond shall, at the request
of the taxpayer, be proportionately reduced.
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tion, however, the Service is stayed from selling seized assets when
a Tax Court Petition has been filed, or where section 6861(b) is
applicable and the time for filing a petition with the Tax Court has
not yet expired, except where perishable goods have been seized or
where the net proceeds will be greatly reduced by the expenses of
conservation and maintenance.49
If collection action is taken and the taxpayer succeeds in whole
or in part before the Tax Court, the Service is, of course, required to
return the seized properties to the taxpayer along with any monies
that may have been levied.50 If the properties have been sold, the
taxpayer is entitled to recover only the amount of the proceeds re-
alized by the Service upon the distress sale of the properties, reduced
by the costs of the seizure and sale.5
Section 6851 is implemented by a finding of a Service employee
52
that the taxpayer "designs" to do an act which tends to "prejudice"
or render "wholly or partly ineffectual" tax collection "proceedings"
unless such proceedings are undertaken "without delay. 53  Accord-
ingly, while section 6861 jeopardy assessments may arise only be-
cause of the risks of "delay" to the tax collection process, section
6851 is based upon the behavior of the taxpayer himself. If the Ser-
vice makes such a finding with respect to a taxpayer, it is prepared to
initiate distraint actions as soon as notice of such finding and a de-
mand for payment is transmitted to the taxpayer.5 4  Section 6851
does not authorize or require an "assessment"; it provides only that
the taxes "are immediately due and payable." Section 6851 makes
no reference to a "deficiency" determination and does not require
even the subsequent mailing of a deficiency notice. Accordingly,
the Service has long held that a termination action under section
6851 does not entitle the taxpayer to seek review in the Tax Court,
55
and the Tax Court has agreed that it has no jurisdiction in termina-
tion cases where no deficiency notice was issued.56
49. Id. § 6863(b)(3).
50. Treas. Reg. § 301.6861-1(d) (1961).
51. Oil City Nat'l Bank v. Dudley, 198 F. Supp. 849 (W.D. Pa. 1961); INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 6342, 6343.
52. Authority to make the required finding has been delegated to the district di-
rectors. Treas. Reg. § 1.6851-1(a) (1959).
53. While the statutory criteria established for the exercise of the termination
powers differ markedly from those for jeopardy assessments, the Internal Revenue
Manual directs a collection officer considering a termination action that "the criteria
and procedure related to jeopardy assessments should be followed." Internal Reve-
nue Service, Internal Revenue Manual § 5213.3(1) (Nov. 25, 1974).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g.-, Ludwig Littauer & Co., 37 B.T.A. 840 (1938).
56. Puritan Church of America, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 485 (1951), affd per curi-
[Vol. 26:315
JEOPARDY TAX COLLECTION
There are other differences between the consequences of a termi-
nation action under section 6851 and a jeopardy assessment under
section 6861. A jeopardy assessment under section 6861 is permis-
sible at any time after a return has been filed or should have been
filed until the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.5 7
A termination action under section 6851 may only be taken in respect
of the current or immediately preceding taxable year.5 s Since a ter-
mination action may occur in the middle of a taxable year, section
6851(b) provides for reopening of the year by either the Service or the
taxpayer so that the annual tax liability can be calculated according
to usual practice. Section 6851(e) provides that payment of taxes
shall not be enforced under the termination section if the taxpayer
provides a bond to insure the timely filing of a return and payment of
taxes due.59
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF JEOPARDY COLLECTION ACTIONS
The broad discretionary power vested in the Service by sections
6851 and 6861 is not accompanied by meaningful statutory criteria
for their implementation. The Service has been largely left alone to
define the elements of "jeopardy" and to ascertain when a tax-
payer's "design" is likely to "prejudice" or "render wholly or partly
ineffectual" tax collection proceedings.
The potential for abuse in the exercise of such ill-defined discre-
tion is substantial. One court of appeals referred to the powers cre-
ated in the jeopardy areas as the "sovereign's stranglehold."60
Another court of appeals, asked to distinguish between sections 6851
and 6861, concluded that, whichever applied in the particular situ-
ation, "to the neck there is no difference.'
Taxpayers against whom jeopardy powers have been exercised
have not surprisingly turned to the courts for relief. Relief has, how-
ever, come in very small doses. Section 7421(a) of the Code provides
am, 209 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954); Ludwig Littauer
& Co., 37 B.T.A. 840 (1938).
57. Saltzman, The Termination of a Taxable Year, 28 TAX LAWYER 91, 93
(1974). If a return was filed, the assessment must be made within three years. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6501(a). If no return was filed, the assessment may be made at
any time. Id. § 6501(c)(3).
58. Id. § 685 1(a).
59. Section 6851(e) also provides that no collection action will be taken "prior to
the expiration of the time otherwise allowed for paying such taxes" if an adequate
bond is furnished. The stay provision of section 6863(b) provides only for a stay by
bonding until a Tax Court decision is reached or until the time for petitioning the Tax
Court has expired.
60. Homan Mfg. Co. v. Long, 242 F.2d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 1957).
61. Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108, 122 (5th Cir, 1974).
1976]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collec-
tion of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, wheth-
er or not such person is the person against whom such tax was as-
sessed. 62  There are, however, statutory and judicially created
exceptions to this flat prohibition which are potentially relevant in
jeopardy situations and which are currently before the Supreme
Court.63 While these exceptions are analyzed more fully in connec-
tion with the pending litigation, a brief summary establishes the back-
ground against which the Court is being asked to determine the extent
of judicial review in jeopardy collection actions.
Section 7421(a) expressly contemplates possible injunctions
where the Service undertakes assessment or collection activities in
respect to matters before the Tax Court or where the Service has
failed to issue a deficiency notice that would provide access to Tax
Court review. 64  In 1962, after decades of vascillation as to the ex-
tent to which the predecessor of section 7421(a) literally applied,
the Supreme Court, in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation
Co.,65 concluded that an injunction against the Service could issue
where equitable relief was appropriate under traditional standards
and where it was "apparent that, under the most liberal view of the
law and facts, the United States cannot establish its claim. '66
The position of the Service with respect to possible judicial review
in jeopardy situations is straightforward:
I. No deficiency notice is required by section 6851. Ac-
cordingly a taxpayer against whom a termination action
has been taken has no recourse to the Tax Court, and the
statutory exception does not apply.
2. The good faith "belief' under section 6861 that tax col-
lection would be prejudiced by delay, or "finding" un-
der section 6851 that a taxpayer is possessed of an
odious "design" that would "tend to prejudice" or
"render wholly or partly ineffective" collection pro-
ceedings, is sufficient in itself to support a termination
action or jeopardy assessment, and no injunctive re-
lief could be granted in the face of such belief or find-
ing under the Supreme Court's 1962 tests.
3. The first two propositions are justified in part because
62. This provision, generally referred to as the Anti-Injunction Act, has been a
part of internal revenue laws of the United States since the earliest days of a federal
income tax. See note 2 supra.
63. United States v. Hall, 493 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 419 U.S. 824
(1974) (No. 74-75).
64. The prohibition applies "[e]xcept as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c),
6213(a) .... " INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7421(a).
65. 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
66. Id. at 7.
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the taxpayer will eventually have recourse to judicial
review by initiating a refund suit in the district court
or the Court of Claims, and may petition the Tax Court
in jeopardy assessment actions.
The taxpayers now before the Supreme Court in Hall 67 and
Laing08 are contending that, as a matter of statutory construction,
termination actions under section 6851 do not deprive a taxpayer of
Tax Court review, and that the denial of such review would consti-
tute a denial of rights to due process and equal protection. In those
cases and in Shapiro,69 the taxpayers are asserting that the Service
cannot rest solely upon its "findings" or "beliefs" without showing
the evidence upon which such findings or beliefs have been based.
V. TAX COURT REVIEW OF TERMINATION ACTIONS
UNDER SECTION 6851
The taxpayers in Hall and Laing sought to enjoin the Service from
taking distraint actions primarily on the ground that the Service had
failed to issue the deficiency notice that would provide an avenue for
Tax Court review prior to the time when seized assets would be sold
by the Service.70  The cases arise from quite different circumstan-
ces. In Laing, the taxpayer was preparing to leave the country, an
act specifically described in section 6851 among those in respect of
which termination action might be desirable. The Hall termination
appears to have been the result primarily of the decision to use sum-
mary termination powers against suspected drug traffickers.7'
On February 1, 1973, the taxpayer, Jane Hall, was handed a ter-
mination notice and demand for payment of income taxes in the
amount of $52,680.25 for the period from January 1 through January
30, 1973. This action followed the arrest and conviction of the tax-
payer's husband in Brownsville, Texas, for trafficking in marijuana
and a search of the taxpayer's home in Kentucky on January 31, 1973,
by ten state policemen. During the search a quantity of drugs was
discovered in her home.
Service representatives demanded payment at once and under-
took seizure of the taxpayer's personal assets. The taxpayer alleged
67. United States v. Hall, 493 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 419 U.S. 824
(1974) (No. 74-75).
68. Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 419 U.S. 824
(1974) (No. 73-1808).
69. Shapiro v. Secretary of State, 499 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub
nom. Commissioner v. Shapiro, 420 U.S. 923 (1975) (No. 74-744).
70. While both suits are based upon the failure of the Service to issue a deficiency
notice, the plaintiffs seek the recovery of all seized assets.
71. See note 106 infra.
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that she had no assets with which to post a bond to avoid sale of her
assets and, instead, initiated an action in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Kentucky, asking that the Service
be enjoined from selling her property. The district court granted a
preliminary injunction requiring the immediate return of the tax-
payer's car upon her posting a bond equal to its value and barring the
Service from "seizing or levying upon any of her property by what-
ever nature ... ,72 The grounds for the action of the district court
were that the Service had failed to provide a deficiency notice that
would have entitled the taxpayer to petition the Tax Court and that,
therefore, the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply.7 3 The district court
decision was affirmed per curiam by the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.74 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.75
The Hall case was consolidated for argument76 in the Supreme
Court with Laing, in which the propriety of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice termination actions had been challenged unsuccessfully.
On May 31, 1972, Laing, a New Zealand citizen, had entered the
United States from Canada on a visitor's visa. On June 24, 1972,
he had attempted to return to Canada, but was denied entry by Cana-
dian officials. The taxpayer returned to the United States where he
was stopped and searched by customs officials. A case containing
approximately $310,000 was discovered in the engine compartment
of the automobile in which the taxpayer and two companions were
riding.
Later that day, a Service official took steps to terminate the 1972
taxable years of all three occupants of the car. Agents interviewed
the three and demanded payment of income tax liabilities of $310,000
from each. When payment was refused, the agents requested and
received orally a tax assessment upon each person in the amount of
$310,000. After a second refusal to make payment, the agents seized
the cash.
On June 29, 1972, the Service sent the taxpayer a written declara-
tion under section 6851 indicating that the taxable year had been ter-
minated and that a tax of $195,985.55 was assessed and made pay-
able for the period from January 1, 1972, through June 24, 1972.
On July 15, 1972, the taxpayer initiated an action, based primarily
upon the failure of the Service to issue a deficiency notice, seeking
to enjoin the Service from continued possession of his properties and
72. (Unreported district court opinion and order).
73. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 5, United States v. Hall, No. 74-75 (U.S.,
filed Aug. 5, 1974).
74. Hall v. United States, 493 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1974).
75. United States v. Hall, 419 U.S. 824 (1974).
76. 419 U.S. 1087 (1974).
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seeking further a declaratory judgment that the termination pro-
visions as applied against him were unconstitutional. On September
18, 1972, the Service moved to dismiss the action or, in the alterna-
tive, for summary judgment. The motion to dismiss was granted by
the district court on September 12, 1972,77 and was affirmed by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.78 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.79
The Hall and Laing cases were argued before the Court in Feb-
ruary, 1975. However, the Court has ordered that the cases be re-
argued in the 1975 Term.8 ° The initial issue raised by Hall and Laing
is whether a taxpayer is entitled to Tax Court review when the ter-
mination provisions of section 6851 are employed against him.
VI. TAX COURT REVIEW OF TERMINATION ACTIONS:
Two INTENTIONS IN SEARCH OF A CONGRESS -
AND AN EXTINCT ALTERNATIVE
The position of the Service that a section 6851 termination action
is not subject to review in the Tax Court does not appear to have been
seriously challenged for many years. The expanded use of the termi-
nation authority in situations where criminal enforcement may have
been at least as important to the Service as tax collection has, how-
ever, generated challenges by taxpayers against whom termination
actions have been taken. In turn, a number of courts throughout the
country have examined the statutory structure of the termination au-
thority anew to determine whether avenues exist for judicial review
of a termination action at a time when a taxpayer might be in need of
relief against wrongful actions. Some of those courts have concluded
that such taxpayers are entitled to petition the Tax Court for relief.
The legislative history of section 6851 is sparse and discloses no Con-
gressional intention with respect to the availability of Tax Court re-
view in termination situations. As a result, the analysis by which
the courts have concluded that taxpayers are or are not entitled to
such review provides an intriguing study in statutory construction.
Termination authority was initially established in section 250(g)
of the Revenue Act of 1918.1 While there have been some modi-
fications of the original text and new provisions have been added to
deal with specific aspects of the termination provisions, the basic
language establishing the termination power has not been changed
77. Laing v. United States, 364 F. Supp. 469 (D. Vt. 1973).
78. Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1974).
79. Laing v. United States, 419 U.S. 824 (1974).
80. 43 U.S.L.W. 3674 (U.S. June 24, 1975).
81. Act of February 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 250(g), 40 Stat. 1084.
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materially. Action is based upon a "finding" that the taxpayer has
the invidious "design" described in the initial paragraph of the sec-
tion. Upon such a finding, a notice and demand is to be made,
and the income tax becomes "immediately due and payable."
The terminology used in the termination section seemed to be di-
rected at potential tax evaders.82 The skimpy explanations provided
by congressional committees and the short discussion of the provision
reflected on the Congressional Record suggest, however, that the
primary purpose of the new provision was to capture income taxes
that might be owed by the thousands of people who were leaving the
country during the period following the end of World War 1.83 The
rationale for such a provision was obvious; since departing taxpayers
were going to put themselves and their assets outside of the reach of
the United States, the Service should be in a position to act before it
was too late to do so.
Despite the emphasis on departing taxpayers, the new termina-
tion power was not limited to those who might be leaving the country.
The power could also be exercised against a person who might be
hiding himself or his assets within the United States or doing "any
other act" which might tend to prejudice or render wholly or partially
ineffectual proceedings to collect the income tax of the current or pre-
ceding taxable year. Although the terms of the statute do not clearly
indicate what steps may be taken after the tax is deemed "due and
payable," it has been asserted by the Service and apparently as-
sumed by the courts that the termination authority includes the pow-
er to act by distraint or to initiate collection proceedings in court.
There was no Tax Court in 1918. The Board of Tax Appeals
was not created until 1924. The normal method of paying taxes
was to file an annual return. If the Service assessed additional taxes,
the only avenue for relief by a taxpayer who disagreed with the as-
sessment action was to pay the taxes assessed and to file a refund
action in the federal court. Until the enactment of the termination
authority in 1918, the powers of the Service to initiate collection pro-
ceedings in court or to exercise its administrative distraint powers
were dependent upon a decision as to the amount of tax due for the
entire taxable year. No collection power was, therefore, available
to the Service during the pendency of a taxable year or during the
succeeding months prior to the date when returns were to be filed.84
82. "Congress wisely empowered the Commissioner, in cases of intent to evade,
to declare all taxes to be due and payable." R. MONTGOMERY, INCOME TAX PROCE-
DURE 241 (1923).
83. See generally 61 CONG. REC. 6112 et seq. (1921).
84. See Act of Oct. 3, 1917, ch. 63, § 3,40 Stat. 301; Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463,
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A new structure for payment of income taxes was prescribed with-
in section 250 of the Code by the 1918 legislation. The termination
power in section 250(g) was part of the structure. Section 250(d)
established limits on the powers of the Service to determine and as-
sess taxes, and to undertake suits or proceedings for collection. Sec-
tion 250(d) established, in effect, a five-year statute of limitations
from the time that a return was due or made except in the case of
false or fraudulent returns. An assessment could only be made after
the return was due or made. There was no provision for jeopardy
assessment.
85
The origins of the Tax Court system can be found in the Revenue
Act of 1921. Section 250(d) was modified in a number of ways in
1921. One of the amendments established for the taxpayer a right
to a hearing "[i]f upon examination of a return made . . . a tax or a
deficiency in tax is discovered. 86 In such a case, the taxpayer was
to receive notice thereof and was given a period of not less than 30
days to file an appeal. The appeal was heard by an administrative
board within the Internal Revenue Service. No assessment would
be made prior to the administrative review, so no lien could be estab-
lished prior to the implementation of the review procedures.
The creation of this first mode of review of a proposed assessment
was accompanied by the establishment of the jeopardy assessment
authority. Section 250(d) ended with the following proviso: "[I]n
cases where the Commissioner believes that the collection of the
amount due will be jeopardized by such delay he may make the as-
sessment without giving such notice or awaiting the conclusion of
such hearing. 8 7
When the provision for administrative review was added in 1921,
no important modification dealing with termination powers was
made in section 250(g). 88 Since the termination power was exercis-
able prior to the time when a return for a taxable year could be pre-
pared in many instances, and prior to the time when it was due in
others, the administrative review procedures were not available to
taxpayers against whom termination actions were taken.
§ 9(a), 39 Stat. 263; R. FOSTER & G. ABBOT, A TREATISE ON THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX UNDER THE ACT OF 1894, at 190ff (1895).
85. "Except in the case of false or fraudulent returns with intent to evade the tax,
the amount of tax due under any return shall be determined and assessed by the Com-
missioner within five years after the return was due or was made, and no suit or pro-
ceeding for the collection of any tax shall be begun after the expiration of five years
after the date when the return was due or was made." Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, §
250(d), 40 Stat. 1083.
86. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 250(d), 42 Stat. 266.
87. Id.
88. Id. § 250(g), 42 Stat. at 267.
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The Board of Tax Appeals was established as an independent re-
viewing body by the Revenue Act of 1924. Section 900(e) of the 1924
Act empowered the Board to hear appeals arising out of proposed
deficiencies and claims for abatement of both estate and income
taxes.8 9 Section 274 of the Code required the Commissioner to no-
tify the taxpayer of a proposed income tax deficiency. Moreover, the
same section prohibited collection actions by distraint as well as
court proceedings until 60 days following the provision of such notice
and entitled the taxpayer to file a notice of appeal to the Board within
the 60-day period.90
Section 274(d) of the 1924 Act preserved the jeopardy assess-
ment, in a somewhat modified form, providing for immediate assess-
ment where the Commissioner believed that "assessment or collec-
tion of a deficiency will be jeopardized by delay."9' Unless the
jeopardy assessment power was exercised, distraint powers could not
be used until the Board had determined a deficiency. However,
Board decisions were not binding on the Service, and collection ac-
tions could be taken in court during the pendency of Board proceed-
ings or even following a decision by the Board in favor of the tax-
payer.
92
The 1924 Act established the termination power in a separate
section of the Code. The new section 282, dealing with termination
powers, made no reference to "deficiencies" or "assessments," ex-
cept that a penalty equal to 25% "of the total amount of the tax or de-
ficiency in the tax" could be added "if a taxpayer violates or attempts
to violate" the section. 9' Further, the new termination section con-
tained no reference to the newly created Board of Tax Appeals.
The Revenue Act of 1926 completed the process of creating an
independent system of review. The Board of Tax Appeals was given
authority to make decisions which were binding upon the Internal
Revenue Service. 94 The 1926 Act further provided that "no assess-
ment of a deficiency . . .and no distraint or proceeding in court for
. .. collection shall be made, begun, or prosecuted" until the expi-
ration of the 60 days following the mailing of the deficiency notice
or, if a petition to the Board was timely filed, until the Board's deci-
sion became final. 95 As an additional safeguard, section 274(a) spe-
cifically authorized the issuance of an injunction against assess-
89. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(e), 43 Stat. 337.
90. Id. § 274, 43 Stat. at 297.
91. Id. § 274(d).
92. Id. §§ 274(b), 279(b), 43 Stat. at 300.
93. Id. § 282(0, 43 Stat. at 303.
94. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 274(b), 44 Stat. 55.
95. Id. § 274(a).
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ments, distraints, or court proceedings during the period of the
prohibition.96
The 1926 Act for the first time treated jeopardy assessments in a
separate section of the Code. Section 279(a) directed the Commis-
sioner to assess, make notice, and demand payment of a deficiency
immediately when he believed that delay would jeopardize assess-
ment or collection of the deficiency. 97 The period during which jeop-
ardy assessments could be made was not specified in section 279, but
section 277(a) provided for assessment within three years after a re-
turn had been filed and section 278(a) provided for assessment "at
any time" after a failure to file a return.98 A jeopardy assessment
could not, therefore, precede the date upon which a return was to be
filed.
The termination authority in the 1926 Act, basically unchanged
from preceding law, was set forth in section 285. 99 The 1928 Act did
not significantly modify these termination powers but merely moved
the termination provision to section 147 of the Code and added sub-
section headings. Section 147(a) was entitled "Tax in Jeopardy." 00
The jeopardy assessment provision became section 273, also substan-
tially unchanged from the 1926 formulation.1 ' l
Although there have been many modifications in the terms and
structure of the Internal Revenue Code since 1928, the statutory to-
pography with respect to termination powers, jeopardy assessments,
and the jurisdiction of the Tax Court has remained largely un-
changed.02  In the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, however, sec-
tions 6851 and 6861 are both found in a subchapter entitled "Jeop-
ardy." 0 3 The text of the various statutory provisions gives no clear
answer to the question of Tax Court jurisdiction in termination situ-
ations. Lower courts have, therefore, endeavored to "harmonize"
the provisions of the Code to derive Congress' intent. The result of
these attempts is a disharmony that the Supreme Court will be re-
quired to correct in Hall and Laing. That task is enlarged by the
possibility that the Congress may never have had any intent with
respect to the issue. In a situation where both litigants offer equally
persuasive inferences from the text and organizational arrangement
96. Id.
97. Id. § 279(a), 43 Stat. at 59.
98. Id. § 277(a)(1), 43 Stat. at 58; § 278(a), 43 Stat. at 59.
99. Id. § 285, 43 Stat. at 68.
100. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 147(a), 45 Stat. 836.
101. Id. § 273, 45 Stat. at 854.
102. S. REP. No. 20, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
103. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, ch. 70, subchapter A.
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of the Code, the fact that the Service's longstanding position has only
recently been challenged may be determinative. An ironic footnote
to the present controversy, however, arises from evidence in the early
history of the termination provisions suggesting the possibility that
Congress may never have intended to authorize distraint proceedings
in termination situations. While the various lower court decisions
dealing with the issue have been thoroughly reported and ana-
lyzed, 10 4 a summary of the alternative analyses now before the Court
is necessary to a full consideration of the nature and scope of judicial
review in jeopardy situations.
VII. THE SCHRECK CASE-
TAXPAYER'S FIRST VICTORY
Section 6851 termination powers may be exercised when the
"Secretary or his delegate finds" that the taxpayer "designs quickly"
to do something. The use of the Internal Revenue collection mecha-
nisms for criminal law enforcement is not new.'1 5 In recent years the
Nixon administration directed that the termination powers in partic-
ular be used in the fight against crime; to effect that end, the Nar-
cotics Enforcement Project was initiated. 0 6 The use of the termina-
tion powers in aid of this program required only that the Com-
missioner have the statutory "belief' about a "design" that would
jeopardize tax collection. When a taxpayer was suspected, if not
necessarily charged, with participating in illegal drug traffic, the
requisite "belief' could be readily justified.
If the Service is correct in its assertion that the termination pow-
ers are not subject to prior review in the Tax Court, the only avenue
for review lies in a suit in the district court. Such a suit is unlikely
to succeed under a literal application of the Anti-Injunction Act.'0 7
104. See Peale, Termination of Taxable Year, 52 TAXES 305 (1974); Saltzman,
The Termination of a Taxable Year, 28 TAX LAWYER 91 (1974); Silver, Terminating
the Taxpayer's Taxable Year: How IRS Uses it Against Narcotics Suspects, 1974 J.
TAXATION 110; Note, Jeopardy Terminations Under Section 6851: The Taxpayer's
Rights and Remedies, 60 IOWA L. REV. 644 (1975); Note, Terminated Tax Years; Co-
herent Relief for the Taxpayer; Willits v. Richardson, 497 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1974), 54
NEB. L. REV. 184 (1975); Note, Termination of the Taxable Year: The Need for Timely
Judicial Review, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 184 (1974); Note, Narcotics Offenders and the
Internal Revenue Code: Sheathing the Section 6851 Sword, 28 VAND. L. REV. 363
(1975); Note, Termination of the Taxable Years: the Quagmire of Internal Revenue
Code Section 6851, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 658 (1974).
105. See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
106. On June 17, 1971, President Nixon announced that an expanded effort to
combat drug abuse would include "systematic tax investigations." Implementation of
the program included the use of termination and jeopardy assessment powers. CCH
INT. REV. MAN. SuPP. at 20373 (1972).
107. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7421. In the government's view, a literal interpre-
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As a result, the use of the termination powers against suspected drug
offenders can effect substantial degrees of penalty without permitting
the taxpayer's recourse to courts and without requiring the govern-
ment to muster any meaningful evidence against the taxpayer. The
availability of eventual review in a refund suit does little to mitigate
the immediate impact of the penalty.
10 8
The use of termination powers for summary criminal punishment
was first questioned seriously in Schreck v. United States,0 9 a 1969
decision by Judge Frank A. Kaufman. In Schreck, federal agents
had seized assets of the taxpayer on October 23, 1967. On Novem-
ber 8, the Service delivered a notice of termination of the partial year
from January 1 to October 25, 1967, and demanded payment of a
"tax due" of $20,730 which had been assessed against the taxpayer.
A notice of levy was filed on November 9, but no deficiency notice
was ever sent to the taxpayer.
The taxpayer initiated an action in the federal district court re-
questing that the Service be required to return the cash and personal
property it had seized and levied upon at the time the demand had
been sent to the taxpayer. The Service sought dismissal of the ac-
tion on the ground that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibited the tax-
payer from obtaining the relief sought. The taxpayer responded that
an injunction was specifically contemplated by Congress in this situ-
ation under section 6213(a) of the Code"0 because the Service had
failed to provide the required deficiency notice.
The Service argued that the exception under section 6213(a)
which allowed Tax Court consideration was inapplicable because the
tation of section 7421(a) is appropriate when termination action is being tested by
court proceedings. See text accompanying notes 142-64 infra.
108. For an excellent discussion of practical consequences of deferred hearings in
distraint proceedings, see Note, Jeopardy Assessment: The Sovereign's Stranglehold,
55 GEO. L.J. 701 (1967).
109. 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969), reaffdon reconsideration, 375 F. Supp. 742
(D. Md. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1566, 4th Cir., May 16, 1974. -
110. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6213:
(a) TIME FOR FILING PETITION AND RESTRICTION ON ASSESSMENT.
Within 90 days, or 150 days if the notice is addressed to a person outside
the States of the Union and the District of Columbia, after notice of deficien-
cy authorized in section 6212 is mailed . . . the taxpayer may file a petition
with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. Except as other-
wise provided in section 6861 no assessment of a deficiency in respect of any
tax imposed by subtitle A or B or Chapter 42 or 43 and no levy or proceeding
in court for its collection shall be made, begun, or prosecuted until such no-
tice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expiration of such 90-day
or 150-day period as the case may be, nor, if a petition has been filed with the
Tax Court, until the decision of the Tax Court has become final. Notwith-
standing the provisions of section 7421(a), the making of such assessment or
the beginning of such proceeding or levy during the time such prohibition is
in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court.
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Tax Court had no jurisdiction with respect to termination actions.
No petition may be filed in the Tax Court until a deficiency notice
is provided. A termination action does not give rise to a deficiency.
Therefore, no notice of deficiency could be provided. Since the
Service is not required to provide a deficiency notice in such situa-
tions, the relief sought would be wholly impermissible.
The taxpayer could, of course, cite no specific authority for his
version of the congressional purpose. He asked the court to infer
congressional intent from the organizational structure of the Code:
since sections 6851 and 6861 are now found in a subchapter of the
Code entitled "Jeopardy Authority," all actions taken under either
section result in jeopardy assessments and are, therefore, subject to
the requirements prescribed for such assessments, including the re-
quirement that a deficiency notice be sent within 60 days of the jeop-
ardy assessment.
The Service responded that jeopardy assessments and termina-
tion actions had always been governed by two different sets of criteria.
Moreover, the termination powers could not be subject to the jeop-
ardy assessment limitations because the termination power was cre-
ated in 1918, three years before the term "jeopardy assessment"
found its way into the Code."' Since it had preceded the jeopardy
assessment authority, the termination assessment power was implicit
in section 6851. In effect, the Service asserted the not unfamiliar
"rule" of statutory construction: When the Congress wanted to re-
quire a notice, it knew how to do it.
Judge Kaufman concluded that there was no direct authority indi-
cating congressional intent. Looking to "the harmony of our care-
fully structured twentieth century system of tax litigation,""' 2 he
searched for precedent, and found eight cases dealing with termina-
tions.1 13 From those cases he concluded that the Government had it-
self been unsure about the correct interpretation of the statute. He
also noted that the "Government takes its present position in the
face of its concession, made less than three years ago, that this posi-
tion [that section 6851 confers implied assessment authority] has no
force.""14
Finding no clear congressional mandate and a confusing history
of interpretation by the Service, Judge Kaufman cited possible con-
stitutional issues and considerations of equity in concluding that sec-
111. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
112. 301 F. Supp. at 1268.
113. Id. at 1276.
114. Id.
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tion 6851 actions were subject to the notice requirements of section
6861. 15 Since no deficiency notice had been provided, the injunc-
tive relief was granted. To hold otherwise, Judge Kaufman stated,
would be
[T]o hold that Congress has constitutionally authorized
the IRS to seize and sell all of a person's property and has
also provided that the person has no right to institute any
court proceeding, for perhaps longer than three years, in
which to litigate the validity of the underlying assessment
and the seizure, while at the same time all jeopardy in-
come taxpayers, other than short-year jeopardy income tax-
payers, have the right to bein a judicial proceeding within
60 days of the assessment."lb
VIII. IRVING v. GRAY -
SCHRECK ANALYSIS REJECTED
The Schreck decision has not yet been reviewed by a court of ap-
peals. The first court of appeals decision dealing with the Schreck
argument resulted, not from the Drug Enforcement Project, but as
part of a celebrated series of legal actions arising out of a purported
autobiography of Howard Hughes written by Clifford Irving. When
the issue was raised by the Irvings, whose position was now sup-
ported by the Schreck decision, the Service responded with a new
explanation of the source of its termination assessment powers
1 17
In early 1972, after the hoax had been uncovered, Clifford and
Edith Irving were residents of Ibiza, Spain. On February 4, 1972,
while both federal and state grand juries were still investigating the
scandal, the Service sent a letter declaring the 1971 calendar year to
be terminated and demanding immediate payment of taxes for 1971
in the amount of $243,118 from Edith and $246,993 from Clifford.
On the same day, the Service levied against the Irvings' accounts
with a brokerage house in New York.
The taxpayers, relying heavily on the reasoning of the Schreck
court, contended that the levy was improper. This time the Service
presented a new response to the taxpayers' claim that the assessment
authority for termination actions derived from section 6861. Aban-
doning the assertion that section 6851 itself constituted the source of
termination assessment power, the Service argued that the general
assessment authority of section 6201 was in fact the basis for termi-
nation assessments. The district court dismissed, declining to follow
115. Id. at 1284.
116. Id. at 1281.
117. Irving v. Gray, 344 F. Supp. 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd, 479 F.2d 20 (2d
Cir. 1973).
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Schreck," s and was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals." 9
The Second Circuit concluded that Schreck had been based up-
on two "erroneous premises." The first was that the assessment
authority used in section 6851 situations must, in the absence of a spe-
"ific provision therein, be derived from section 6861. The Service's
new position that section 6201 was the applicable assessment pro-
vision was accepted.
The Second Circuit also rejected the premise that the Tax Court
was the only forum for immediate judicial review. There was no de-
ficiency and, therefore, no avenue to the Tax Court. But there is an
avenue for review provided by the suit for refund: "The taxpayers
. . .could have had their complaint of an overpayment heard in the
district court below if they had filed full-year returns reporting over-
payments of tax; they could have commenced plenary refund actions
six months after filing the returns."'20 The court further indicated
that the Irvings could not have been afforded equitable relief even if
a statutory avenue were available: "[I]t is bearable inequity that
those whose 'bold plans' are frustrated may suffer potentially costly
inconveniences.''
The Service argued in both Schreck and Irving that it would be
inappropriate to provide review in the Tax Court for a terminated
year because of the possibility of reopening the year. Since the ter-
minated year could be reopened either by the taxpayer or the Ser-
vice, 122 the liability determined did not constitute a final calculation
which would be appropriate for Tax Court review. The Second Cir-
cuit apparently embraced that rationale. It concluded that one of the
grounds for affirming the denial of injunctive relief was that "there
was no deficiency assessment made." Since there was no "deficiency
assessment," there could presumably be no "deficiency notice."'
123
IX. OTHER CIRCUITS SPLIT
prior to the decision of the Second Circuit in the Irving case, the
question of deficiency notices in termination actions had been raised
collaterally before the Seventh Circuit in Williamson v. United
States. z4 The taxpayer was arrested on October 18, 1967, and two
118. Id.
119. 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973).
120. Id. at 24.
121. Id. at 25. This same justification could, of course, be advanced when a court
is confronting a suspected drug pusher's arguments.
122. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6851(b).
123. 479 F.2d at 25.
124. 31 Am. Fed. Tax. R. 2d 73-800 (7th Cir. 1971).
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days later the Internal Revenue Service seized the contents of his
safe deposit box. After filing his 1967 return, the taxpayer had filed
a refund claim and sued for the refund. The district court dismissed
his complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal on other
grounds, but took the opportunity to reject the argument that the Ser-
vice was required to send a deficiency notice in a termination situa-
tion. The court concluded that there was no "deficiency" and, there-
fore, a deficiency notice could not be required.
[A deficiency is defined by section 6211 of the Code] as the
amount by which the "tax imposed" exceeds the amount
shown on the tax return. The assessment in this case was
not an imposed tax, but merely an amount which the [Inter-
nal Revenue Service] believed justified the termination of the
taxable year. Since no return has been filed at the date of
the assessment, no deficiency was determinable.1
25
In 1974 the Fifth Circuit, in Clark v. Campbell,126 reached the
same conclusion that Judge Kaufman had reached in Schreck. The
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, armed with a warrant,
searched two buildings in Dallas on June 11, 1969. Three days later
the Internal Revenue Service mailed a termination letter announcing
an assessment of $104,697.20. An action was initiated by the tax-
payer in November 1969 seeking to remove clouds on property title
and to enjoin levy and seizure of his property because no deficiency
notice had been issued. The district court ordered assessment and
levy enjoined unless a deficiency notice was issued. 127 The Service
appealed unsuccessfully.
28
The Fifth Circuit specifically rejected the Service contention that
a taking by authority of section 6851 did not constitute the imposition
of a tax because of the possibility of reopening the prematurely termi-
nated taxable year: "[T]he tax remains immediately payable unless
[the] bonding option is exercised and the taxpayer's assets remain im-
mobilized.' 29
125. Id. at 73-800.
126. 501 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1974).
127. Clark v. Campbell, 341 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Tex. 1972), afi'd., 501 F.2d 108
(5th Cir. 1974).
128. 501 F.2d at 109. The Fifth Circuit was unimpressed with the differences be-
tween sections 6851 and 6861. Id. at 124 n.52. The court was, however, highly im-
pressed with the powers created by the termination provisions: "A weapon little
known and previously not too often employed, having atomic potentialities in the ar-
senal of the tax gatherer . . ." Id. at 110.
129. Id. at 118. The court also cited an indication that the Tax Court was "no
longer comfortable" with the Service's reading of Ludwig Littauer & Co., 37 B.T.A.
840 (1938). Littauer held that because of the possibility of reopening a terminated
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The Fifth Circuit was not sure whether a termination action cre-
ated a "deficiency," but it was certain that the deficiency notice re-
quirements applied where a termination action had been taken:
We agree with Schreck that § 6211 and the applicable
regulations are broad enough to cover the "thing" created
by an assessment following a § 6851 termination ....
What is more, we believe that the liability created under §
6851 is as a matter of fact the same type of "thing" as a §
6211 deficiency. We see no significant distinction, nor any
need for one.
The court recognized that the predecessor of section 6851 had
been enacted prior to the establishment of jeopardy assessment pro-
visions, but did not regard the chronology of original enactment as
determinative of a present congressional intent. The revenue sys-
tem, the court noted, had developed from an "unintegrated collection
of separate revenue acts through two careful codifications." The
process "may well create new affiliations between long existent, but
formerly disparate provisions."13' The court perceived two kinds of
assessment authority. Normal assessments are authorized by sec-
tion 6201. Jeopardy actions are governed by section 6861, and ter-
mination actions come within the framework of the jeopardy provi-
sions. Any other conclusion would be "a complete derogation of
the obvious and carefully considered pattern of the Code."'132
The court buttressed its statutory inferences by observing that no
governmental interest would be risked by a prior hearing in termina-
tion situations. In the wake of these considerations, the court con-
cluded that "Congress meant for the deficiency notice procedures of
section 6861 to be equally applicable to a section 6851 quick-termina-
tion taxpayer."'33
In 1974 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals embraced the Schreck
analysis. In United States v. Rambo,134 the court emphasized that
its interpretation of the legislative structure was based in large mea-
year, the termination powers did not create a deficiency for notice purposes.
Littauer had been rigorously applied, but the Fifth Circuit sensed a modification of
this position in Nino Sanzogno, 60 T.C. 321 (1973). In Sanzogno, the Tax Court had
held that Form I040C, required of departing aliens by section 6851(d), constituted a
return. Such a holding is inconsistent with the proposition that section 6851 con-
cerns interim indices of an eventual tax-liability determination.
130. 501 F.2d at 119-20.
131. Id. at 120.
132. Id. at 121.
133. Id. at 126.
134. 492 F.2d 1060 (6th Cir. 1974),petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3017 (U.S.
July 10, 1974) (No. 73-2005).
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sure upon a desire to avoid "serious question of a denial to the tax-
payer of his property without due process of law." '135
The issue of Tax Court reviewability has not been determined in
the other circuits. 13 6 District courts in circuits that have not finally
determined the applicability of the Schreck analysis have also di-
vided. 137 A judicial scorecard of views on the issue would substanti-
ate only a single conclusion: It is not possible to determine whether
Congress intended to provide Tax Court review of termination ac-
tions. Some judges have implored Congress to address itself to the
issue.'38 But Congressional action prior to reargument and a deter-
mination of the issue by the Supreme Court in Hall and Laing is at
best unlikely. A judicial coin flip is, therefore, inevitable.
Neither the court of appeals decision in Hall nor the Laing deci-
sion provides any new analysis of the question. The Sixth Circuit's
per curiam opinion in Hall indicated that the issue had already been
decided in Rambo.13 9  In Laing the Second Circuit indicated that the
issue had been resolved in Irving case.'
40
X. THE EXTINCT ALTERNATIVE
There is no indication that any court dealing with the termina-
tion-review issue has considered whether a termination was intended
to be a basis for the initiation of distraint action. The absence of
such consideration is understandable in light of the Service's long-
unchallenged use of section 6851 and its predecessors as a justifica-
tion for distraint actions. There is, however, direct authority for the
proposition that the formulation initially used in the 1918 Act and
135. Id. at 1064.
136. The issue of using termination in criminal cases has arisen in the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Lewis v. Sandler, 498 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1974). The taxpayer challenged a ter-
mination action against him and sought to have his suit treated as a class action on
behalf of those against whom collection actions had been taken for criminal-law-en-
forcement reasons. The suit was dismissed, however, when the Service returned the
assets that had been seized and admitted that it had made an assessment for the wrong
tax year. The court affirmed the denial of certification as a class action.
137. See, e.g., Preble v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Mass. 1974); Lisner
v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398 (D. Ariz. 1973).
138. See, e.g., Preble v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1369, 1373 (D. Mass. 1974):
"Perhaps Congress, in memory of an overburdened judiciary will someday give us a
Code more amenable to clear interpretation. Until then, we will continue to have
responsible jurists reaching contrary conclusions on issues such as those involved here,
resulting in added confusion to the operation of the tax system." Judge Freidman's
sentiments about the task of statutory construction in this instance were not dissimilar
from those of the Fifth Circuit in Clark v. Campbell: "[T]he intricate structure of the
tax act-which we painstakingly, perhaps painfully painstakingly dissect. ... 501
F.2d 108, 110 (5th Cir. 1974).
139. 493 F.2d 1211, 1212.
140. 496 F.2d 853, 854.
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still found in section 6851 authorized the Service only to initiate col-
lection proceedings in court for the purpose of protecting against loss
of jeopardized tax revenues.
Although the Service today relies almost wholly upon its statu-
tory distraint powers, 141 there was a time when judicial proceedings
to collect taxes were not uncommon. 142  Such proceedings were
based merely upon the allegation that the Service was a creditor of
the taxpayer and, as such, was entitled to sue on the debt. In such
suits it would be possible to attach assets of the taxpayer in the man-
ner prescribed by the rules of practice in the particular court. Judi-
cial review of such proceedings was, of course, automatic. The Ser-
vice was using the judiciary to collect taxes.
The administrative distraint powers have been part of the federal
tax laws since at least 1866.143 When the Revenue Act of 1918 was
passed, the distraint powers were not materially different from those
presently in use. Distraint powers could be exercised against assets
of the taxpayer that were subject to the federal tax lien.144 The fed-
eral tax lien came into being when .an assessment was made. 145  Prior
to an assessment, there was no lien; accordingly, no distraint actions
were possible. But collection proceedings in court were permissible
even though there had been no assessment.
146
The Service has repeatedly asserted that the Congress knew how
to prescribe special assessment authority when it wished to do so.
One such situation is that presented by the jeopardy assessment pow-
er. But the termination provisions, established originally in the 1918
Act just three years prior to the creation of jeopardy assessment au-
141. Since the distraint powers authorized by section 6331 may be exercised with-
out resort to the courts, the process is more rapid and allows collection officers wider
latitude in exercising discretion. There are remedies, however, that may only be
sought by court action. In United States v. Shaheen, 445 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1971), for
example, the Government initiated a collection action and sought a writ ne exeat re-
publica to prevent the taxpayer-defendant from leaving the country.
142. See R. FOSTER & E. ABBOT, A TREATISE ON THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
UNDER THE ACT OF 1894, at 224 (1895): "A suit by the United States to foreclose their
lien for taxes, although less expeditious than a statutory sale, may be more prudent
when the amount of the tax is large, since a judicial sale under the decree of a court
will produce higher bids."
143. Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9, 14 Stat. 101.
144. INTERNAL REVENUE § 3187, 1874 Rev. U.S. Stats. 612.
145. Id. § 3186.
146. G. HOLMES, FEDERAL INCOME AND PROFITS TAXES 583 (1919):
The only qualification upon this right to resort to a plenary suit in the absence
of an assessment is that the tax must be ascertainable and determinable, on
evidence, by a court, and a tax of fixed percentage in a subject or object
which is so definitely described in the statute that its amount or value can be
so ascertained or determined may be recovered in an action though it has
never been fixed by assessment.
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thority, have never by their terms provided for a special assessment
power.
The 1918 Act appears to have authorized "proceedings." The
Commissioner was authorized to act in effect when "proceedings to
colleit the tax [should be] brought without delay." The only action to
collect income taxes due and payable, but which had not been as-
sessed, was by the initiation of a suit in a court of law. Ordinarily,
such suits could not be brought until the end of the year when the tax
was due. Section 250(d) contemplated proceedings at once, but pro-
vided no power for immediate assessment.
After establishing the power of the Commissioner to act even
though the normal assessment period had not arrived, the Code indi-
cates that a tax is "due and payable," and describes but one other
consequence of the termination:
In any action suit brought to enforce payment of taxes made
due and payable by virtue of the provisions of this subdivi-
sion the finding of the Commission, made as herein provi-
ded, whether made after notiee to the taxpayer or not, shall
be for all purposes presumptive evidence of the taxpayer's
design.
147
"Presumptive evidence" would not, of course, be relevant to a dis-
traint action undertaken directly by the Service for there would be no
burden of proof for the Service to bear.
The response of the Service to such an analysis would presum-
ably be that the termination power was so pervasive that distraint
proceedings were surely contemplated. There was a general assess-
ment authority in 1918 not unlike section 6201 of the present act.
148
One can infer that the Congress intended to apply such general as-
sessment authority in termination situations where, after all, tax-
payers were endeavoring to evade their income tax liabilities.
Moreover, there is no evidence from the periodic modifications and
reenactments of the termination provisions that the Congress meant
to restrict the availability of the distraint power.
But those reenactments have never expressly created an assess-
ment power-and the Congress knows how to create a power of as-
sessment when it wishes to do so. Moreover, there is a niggling
doubt about the distraint power raised in part by the position of the
Service itself during the early part of the 1920's. In 1923 the Ser-
vice ruled with respect to the relevant portion of section 250 that
"proceedings" referred only to judicial proceedings and not to the
147. This provision has also appeared in each incarnation of the termination pro-
vision since 1918.
148. INTERNAL REVENUE § 3182, 1874 Rev. U.S. Stats. 611.
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distraint powers. 49  If the termination power of 250(g) established
only the right to initiate early "proceedings" and if "proceedings"
did not include the power to exercise administrative distraint powers,
the termination provision could not be used to levy and seize prop-
erties and property rights of the taxpayer. In response to this ob-
scure footnote in the history of federal tax administration, the Ser-
vice could eagerly admit that it was proved wrong in 1923 and that,
in any event, the use of the term "proceedings" in the 1923 ruling
arose in another context.
The context was indeed different. In its ruling the Service was
asserting that only court actions were limited by the statute of limita-
tions set forth in section 250(d); distraint powers were not so limited.
As a result of the Service's interpretation, the statute of limitations
was made specifically applicable to distraint actions by the Revenue
Act of 1924.150 And the Service was eventually held to have been
wrong. In response to a taxpayer's challenge to the Service's inter-
pretation for a taxable year prior to the 1924 amendment, the Su-
preme Court held that the term "proceedings" is "rightly used as
descriptive of steps taken for the distraint and sale of property to en-
force payment of taxes."'15' The Court found no direct authority for
its conclusion, but found that it could "reasonably . . . be inferred
from its terms and the circumstances of its enactment."'52  Finally,
the Court noted that the 1924 amendment tended to confirm that the
limits were meant to apply to "distraints as well as suits."'
' 53
The opinion also included a gratuitous assumption with respect to
the use of the term "proceedings" in the termination section: "In a
later part, subdivision (g) of § 250, 'proceedings' is used broadly in
reference to steps for the collection of taxes. Obviously its mean-
ing is not there limited to collection by suit.' ' 154 This "obvious" con-
clusion is, however, supported by no authority.
The Court in that case 155 dealt with a taxpayer who was con-
.fronted with an attempt by the Service to extend its powers by avoid-
ing a statute of limitations. A strict interpretation limiting the Ser-
vice's collection powers was applied. The scope of termination
powers was not at issue in the case; it should not, therefore, be re-
garded as binding with respect to the definition of termination powers.
Moreover, the 1924 amendment adding the reference to distraint au-
149. I. T. 1446, 1-2 CUM. BULL. 218 (1922).
150. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 278(e), 43 Stat. 300.
151. Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co., 273 U.S. 346, 351 (1927).
152. Id. at 350.
153. Id. at 351.
154. Id. at 352.
155. 273 U.S. 346, 348 (1927).
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thority was restricted to the statute-of-limitation provisions. No
such amendment was made in the actual termination provisions.'
15 6
The present position of the Service, asserted in Hall and Laing, is
remarkably consistent with the conclusion that no assessment author-
ity was provided in the termination situation. Having abandoned its
position in Schreck, the Service now contends that termination as-
sessments are authorized by the general assessment power of sec-
tion 6201(a). But the Service also asserts that a termination amount
"due and payable" does not constitute an "imposed tax" because it
is a preliminary determination of amounts potentially due; reopening
of the year by the Service or the taxpayer may vary the amount of
the tax for the year in question. Since section 6212(a) requires defi-
ciency notices only in respect of "any tax imposed," the ticket to the
tax Court need not be issued.
But the general assessment authority provided by section 6201(a)
applies only in respect of "taxes . . . imposed by this title." Accord-
ingly, the contentions of the Service itself may lead to the conclusion
that assessments are permissible under neither section 6201 nor sec-
tion 6861. In that event there is a tax due and payable, but no assess-
ment is yet authorized. There is no lien until an assessment is made.
The distraint powers may only be exercised against property subject
to lien.
XI. EFFECT OF DECISION REGARDING TAX COURT REVIEW
OF TERMINATION ACTIONS
The Supreme Court is now being asked to choose between two
alternative statutory interpretations, neither of which is required or
strongly supported by the legislative history. It appears that there
is no less authority for a third interpretation of the termination pow-
ers that has not been explored in lower court decisions and which,
therefore, the Supreme Court is unlikely to address at this time.
If the Court determines that the language and "harmonics" of the
Code provide a path to the Tax Court for taxpayers suffering termi-
nation actions, broader questions of judicial review need not be
addressed in Hall and Laing. But if the Court affirms the position of
the Service that termination powers include distraint and that Tax
Court review in such cases is not available, the applicability of the
Williams Packing doctrine in suits to enjoin termination proceedings
will remain. In that event, Hall and Laing will join the Shapiro
case to provide a full test of the Williams Packing doctrine under
both jeopardy sections.
156. Revenue Act of 1924, § 282, 43 Stat. 302.
157. Enoch v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
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XII. APPLICATION OF ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
IN JEOPARDY SITUATIONS
If the Supreme Court concludes in Hall and Laing that taxpayers
suffering termination actions are vulnerable to distraint actions with-
out recourse to the Tax Court for prior review, there will still remain
the possibility of injunctive relief despite the general prohibitions of
section 7421(a). The other case in which certiorari has been granted,
Commissioner v. Shapiro, '58 questions the role of the district courts
in examining the exercise of jeopardy assessment powers in the face
of the apparently absolute prohibition of the Anti-Injunction Act.
The Shapiro case arises from a jeopardy assessment under section
6861(a) against a citizen of Israel who was being extradited from the
United States to Israel, where he had been indicted for securities
fraud. On December 6, 1973, three days prior to an extradition date
that had been accepted by the taxpayer, jeopardy assessments were
entered in respect of 1970 and 1971 in the total amount of $92,726.41.
On that same day tax liens were filed and notices of levy served upon
various banks in the State of New York in which the taxpayer main-
tained accounts or safe deposit boxes.
The taxpayer initiated a suit in the District Court for the District
of Columbia seeking to enjoin the extradition as well as the collection
actions. A temporary restraining order was requested upon the tax-
payer's affidavit that he owed no federal income taxes. This motion
was granted after a hearing, and a subsequent hearing was held to
determine whether the taxpayer was entitled to a preliminary injunc-
tion. On December 21, 1973, the Service mailed a deficiency notice
advising the taxpayer that the 1970 assessment was based upon unex-
plained bank deposits of $18,000, and that the 1971 assessment was
based upon unreported income of $137,280 deriving from sales of
illegal drugs.
A final hearing on December 21, 1973, resulted in dismissal of
the suit.1 59 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, how-
ever, reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for an examina-
tion of the facts upon which the jeopardy assessment had been
based.' 60 The reversal was premised upon the long-standing judicial
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. The Service does not contest
the existence of such a judicial exception. It is, however, concerned
with the practical enlargement of the exception by the imposition of
158. Shapiro v. Secretary of State, 499 F.2d 527 (D.D.C. 1974), cert. granted sub
nom. Commissioner v. Shapiro, 420 U.S. 923 (1975) (No. 74-744).
159. (Unreported district court order).
160. 499 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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evidentiary burdens on the Service. The Service, therefore, success-
fully petitioned for Supreme Court review.
XIII. THE STRICT PROHIBITION OF THE STATUTE
Section 7421(a) provides that "no suit for the purpose of restrain-
ing the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any
court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against
whom such tax was assessed." There are several exceptions to the
general prohibition, including those which obtain where the required
deficiency notices have not been sent or where the matter is pending
before the Tax Court. None of these statutory exceptions is applic-
able in Shapiro because the Service, using the jeopardy assessment
provisions of section 6861, issued the necessary deficiency notice
within the required time.
In the past the Service argued that the Anti-Injunction Act consti-
tutes an absolute prohibition against injunctive relief for taxpayers
against whom collection actions have been taken: "the Code means
what it says." The Supreme Court has not, however, agreed that the
prohibition is absolute. After a period of great ambiguity with re-
spect to the possibility of judicially created exceptions to the prohibi-
tory language of the statute, the Court in 1962 indicated that the ex-
ceptions would be narrowly construed. That decision was reaffirmed
in two cases handed down by the Supreme Court on the day that the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rendered its opinion in
Shapiro.'61
The strict prohibition of the Code has been subjected to attack
from its inception. It has from time to time been contended that the
prohibition against injunctive relief constituted a violation of the due
process rights of taxpayers subjected to summary distraint actions.
That contention appeared to have been finally rejected in 1931 by the
Supreme Court in Phillips v. Commissioner. 62  In that case the
Court suggested that where "only" property rights were at risk,
postponement of judicial inquiry was not a denial of due process if th
opportunity for an ultimate judicial determination would be given. 163
"[T]wo alternative methods of eventual judicial review" were avail-
able to the plaintiff: petition the Board of Tax Appeals or institute
suit for refund.164 The Court was clear about the balance between
individual property rights and the needs of government:
161. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974); Alexander v. "Americans
United," Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974).
162. Id. at 589 (1931).
163. Id. at 596-97.
164. 283 U.S. at 597.
1976]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Delay in the judicial determination of property rights is
uncommon where it is essential that governmental needs be
immediately satisfied. For the protection of public health,
a State may order the summary destruction of property by
administrative authorities without antecedent notice or
hearing . . . . Because of the public necessity, the prop-
erty of citizens may be summarily seized in war-time ....
And at any time, the United States may acquire property
by eminent domain, without paying, or determining the
amount of compensation before the taking.
65
The bonding provisions allowing deferral of the distraint actions
pending judicial review were not essential to the constitutionality of
the taking. The provision for delaying payment by filing a bond
"was granted by the sovereign as a matter of grace solely for the con-
venience of the taxpayer."'
6F
Despite its resounding affirmation of the Treasury's right to take
first and litigate afterwards, the Court appeared somewhat equivo-
cal about the scope of the Anti-Injunction Act, due to the costs and
hardships attending the lengthy postponement of inquiry into the
legitimacy of a governmental taking. One year after the Phillips
decision was rendered, the Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of an
injunction against an attempt to collect a tax.
In Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 16 7 the taxpayer had
sought to restrain collection of a tax on margarine. Prior to these
attempted collections, the district court for Rhode Island had decided
that the taxpayer's products were not subject to the excise tax in
question. 16 8 The Supreme Court affirmed the injunction order re-
ferring to the "special circumstances" present in that case.'
69
The somewhat imprecise term, "extraordinary circumstances,"
employed in Standard Nut Margarine served as an invitation to
lower courts to look for circumstances that would justify equitable
relief for taxpayers despite the Anti-Injunction Act. Standard Nut
Margarine had involved a situation where it had already been de-
termined, by a federal court, that the tax could not be imposed on
the taxpayer. In applying this doctrine, however, lower courts ap-
peared to weigh the potential inequities of the collection action
against the probability that the assessment would not stand. 170
A situation in which the consideration of the facts and circum-
stances in each particular case was possible constituted an invita-
165. Id.
166. Id. at 599.
167. 284 U.S. 498 (1932).
168. Higgins Mfg. Co. v. Page, 297 F. 644 (D.R.I. 1924).
169. 284 U.S. at 511.
170. See Hochman & Tack, Jeopardy Assessments-A System in Jeopardy, 45
TAXES 418, 423 (1967).
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tion to sue for injunctive relief wherever distraint actions were un-
dertaken. The resultant spate of litigation caused the Supreme
Court to address the matter again in 1962 in Enochs v. Williams
Packing & Navigation Co. 7' The taxpayer sued to enjoin collec-
tion of social security and employment taxes. Rejecting the appli-
cation of section 7421(a), the district court issued a permanent in-
junction against the Service prohibiting the collection of the taxes
on the ground that the taxes were not payable and that collection
would destroy the taxpayer's business.1 72 The order was affirmed by
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 173 but was reversed by the Su-
preme Court.
The Court referred to its earlier holding in Standard Nut Mar-
garine, and indicated that an injunction might be permissible where
"it is clear that under no circumstances could the government ulti-
mately prevail" and where "equity jurisdiction otherwise exists."1 74
The traditional criteria for the exercise of equity powers were
not substantially disputed. The trial court should look to availabil-
ity of legal remedies. But the adequacy of the legal remedies was
not determinative of the availability of injunctive relief.1 75 The Su-
preme Court described more fully the heavy burden involved in show-
ing that the Service could not win:
We believe that the question of whether the government
has a chance of ultimately prevailing is to be determined
on the basis of the information available to it at the time
of suit. Only if it is then apparent that, under the most
liberal view of the law and the facts, the United States
cannot establish its claim, may the suit for an injunction be
maintained. Otherwise, the District Court is without ju-
risdiction, and the complaint must be dismissed. To re-
quire more than good faith on the part of the Government
would unduly interfere with a collateral objective of the
Act-protection of the collector from litigation pending a
suit for refund. And to permit even the maintenance of a
suit in which an injunction could issue only after the tax-
payer's nonliability had been conclusively established
might "in every practical sense operate to suspend collec-
tion of the . . . taxes until the litigation is ended."
176
Since the record indicated that the government's claim "was not
171. 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
172. 176 F. Supp. 168 (S.D. Miss. 1959), affd, 291 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'd,
370 U.S. 1 (1962).
173. 291 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
174. 370 U.S. at 7.
175. Id. at 6.
176. 370 U.S. at 7-8, citing Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S.
293, 299 (1943).
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without foundation," the injunction was set aside and the case re-
manded for dismissal. The Court gave no indication of the "foun-
dation" necessary for the Service's unfettered action, nor did it pro-
vide meaningful guidance as to the manner in which district court
judges should receive evidence with respect to the existence of such
"foundation."
It was widely assumed that the Williams Packing decision had
firmly closed the door to most taxpayers seeking equitable relief
from collection actions. 17  By 1974, however, the Court found it-
self confronted with several new cases arising out of alleged excep-
tions to or applications of its decision in Williams Packing.
In Bob Jones University v. Simon 7 8 and in Alexander v. "Amer-
icans United", Inc.,'1 7 9 tax-exempt organizations were endeavoring to
enjoin the Internal Revenue Service from withdrawing rulings which
assured deductibility of gifts to the organizations as charitable con-
tributions. The taxpayer in Bob Jones alleged irreparable injury
in the form of substantial federal income tax liability and the loss
of contributions pending clarification of the University's tax-exempt
status. The taxpayer argued further that because racial segrega-
tion was a religious tenet of the University, revoking the prior tax-
exempt status for private schools maintaining racially discriminatory
admissions policies violated free exercise of religion, free associa-
tion, due process, and equal protection of the laws.
The Court noted the strong reasons for which the taxpayer was
seeking a prior determination of the propriety of the Service's
action. But it observed that the Anti-Injunction Act had been given
"almost literal effect" in Williams Packing, and it indicated a firm
resolve to avoid reopening the issue to another round of litigation:
But the Court's unanimous opinion in Williams Packing
indicates that the case was meant to be the capstone to ju-
dicial construction of the Act. It spells an end to a cycli-
cal pattern of allegiance to the plain meaning of the Act,
followed by periods of uncertainty caused by a judicial de-
parture from that meaning, and followed in turn by the
Court's rediscovery of the Act's purpose."o
The Court interpreted the taxpayer's position as an attempt to
establish equity as the sole basis for providing injunctive relief.
That position, according to the Court, could not be justified:
177. See Odell, Assessments: What Are They-Ordinary? Immediate? Jeopardy?,
N.Y.U. 31ST INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1516 (1973).
178. 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
179. 416 U.S. 752 (1974).
180. 416 U.S. at 742.
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Under the language of the Act, the degree of harm is not a
factor, and as a matter of judicial construction, it does not
provide a meaningful stopping point between Standard
Nut and Williams Packing. Acceptance of petitioner's ir-
reparable injury argument would simply revive the evis-
ceration of the Act inherent in Standard Nut.'8'
The due process argument was also dismissed on the ground that
"[t]hese review procedures offer petitioner a full, albeit delayed,
opportunity to litigate the legality of the Service's revocation of tax-
exempt status and withdrawal of advance assurance of deductibil-
ity.' 8 2 If a balancing of interests was appropriate, the Government
would prevail:
And although the congressional restriction to posten-
forcement review may place an organization claiming tax
exempt status in a precarious financial position, the prob-
lems presented do not rise to the level of constitutional in-
firmities, in light of the powerful governmental interest in
protecting the administration of the tax system from pre-
mature judicial interference.18 3
The Americans United case was decided on the same grounds.
In both cases, the Court rejected arguments that section 7421(a)
was inapplicable because the taxpayer did not seek to enjoin the
assessment or collection of its own taxes or to disrupt the collec-
tion process, but to "avoid the disposition of funds from the corpo-
ration." 8 4 Mr. Justice Blackmun dissented in Americans United on
grounds that the suit did not appear to be "for the purpose of re-
straining . . . any tax." He expressed concern with the unrestrained
powers of the Internal Revenue Service and the fact that "the
path to judicial review is so discouragingly long and expensive."' 8 5
In light of the concerns expressed by Mr. Justice Blackmun in
that dissent, it is not surprising that issues of judicial review are
before the Supreme Court within two years of its solemn assertion
that the "capstone" had been placed on the issue. The fundamen-
tal problem with the Court's capstone is confronted directly in
Shapiro and indirectly in Laing and Hall. The test established in
Williams Packing is twofold: the propriety of equitable relief must
be established, and it must be shown that the Service could not ulti-
mately prevail.
181. Id.at745-46.
182. Id. at 746.
183. Id. at 747.
184. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 739 (1974); Alexander v. "Ameri-
cans United," Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 766 (1974).
185. Id. at 763.
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The criteria for determining a party's eligibility for equitable re-
lief have evolved over centuries of litigation. The basic question is
whether there are adequate legal remedies available to the party.
Of course, avenues for eventual judicial review exist in both the
termination action and the jeopardy assessment situation. Where a
termination has occurred, the Service's position is that the taxpayer
is not entitled to Tax Court review. In both situations, however,
an eventual refund suit is available to the taxpayer. In both situa-
tions, moreover, collection actions can be avoided by the posting of
a bond sufficient to protect the interest of the Service in the assets
against which collection action could be taken. It is, therefore,
possible that the Court could conclude that equitable relief is never
required in termination or jeopardy assessment situations. Such
a determination by the Court would be quite inconsistent with its
analysis of the considerations justifying equitable relief in other cases
as well as its recent recognition of the constitutional necessity of pro-
viding prior review where property is taken pursuant to judicial
proceedings initiated by a private creditor.
XIV. THE AVAILABILITY OF EQUITABLE RELIEF
Shapiro's claim for equitable relief derives primarily from his
contention that the monies seized by the Service are required for
bail in Israel. If bail could not be posted, Shapiro would be incar-
cerated when he returns to Israel. He contends that the availabil-
ity of eventual judicial review, even in the Tax Court, will not pro-
vide adequate relief to him.' 86
Hall and Laing have thus far been denied access to the Tax
Court. Their initial claim for equitable relief is based upon the Ser-
vice's failure to provide the statutorily required deficiency notice.
Even if it is determined that the Service is not required to provide
such notice, Hall and Laing could still argue that equitable relief is
appropriate. Virtually all of Hall's assets were in risk of being
seized. She claims that she is not in a position to post bond or
finance her defense. Recovery of the proceeds of a distraint sale
at some indefinite future time would not be an adequate remedy.'87
Laing similarly argues that all of his assets in the United States
have been wrongfully taken and that he can not conduct an adequate
defense without them.
188
186. Shapiro v. Secretary of State, 499 F.2d 527, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
granted sub nom. Commissioner v. Shapiro, 420 U.S. 923 (1975) (No. 74-744).
187. Hall argues further that she could not file a refund suit because of the "full
payment rule." See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
188. Brief for Appellee at 35, Laing v. United States, No. 73-1808 (filed May 31,
1974).
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The Supreme Court is unlikely to become involved in the balanc-
ing of interests that determines the propriety of particular forms of
equitable relief in each particular case. The Court has, however,
specifically countenanced the possibility that the destruction of a
taxpayer's business by collection action could be a ground for provid-
ing equitable relief despite the eventual availability of judicial re-
view. 8 9 It seems unlikely, therefore, that the Court would be will-
ing to conclude in any of these cases that the provision of equitable
relief by a trial court would constitute reversible error.
The usual appeals for equitable relief are further buttressed by
the Supreme Court's express recognition of the constitutional in-
firmities inherent in situations where property is taken without
opportunity for prior judicial review. In Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp. 90 the Court struck down a garnishment action in behalf of a
private creditor where there had been no notice or opportunity for
hearing prior to the levy. The majority opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas concluded that due process requirements were not satis-
fied despite the opportunity for eventual judicial review.
In Fuentes v. Shevin,191 the Court concluded that state laws pro-
viding for seizure of an alleged debtor's property without prior no-
ice and hearing also constituted a denial of due process. The
availability of eventual judicial review and the opportunity to re-
cover the seized property by posting a bond did not validate the
takings.
92
Both Sniadach and Fuentes contained language indicating that
all governmental takings of property without prior notice and hear-
ing were not necessarily unconstitutional. In Sniadach, Mr. Justice
Douglas wrote that "[s]uch summary procedure may well meet the
requirements of due process in extraordinary situations" and re-
ferred to those "requiring special protection to a state or creditor
interest."193 In Fuentes, the Court undertook an enumeration of such
situations:
These situations . . . must be truly unusual. Only in a
few limited situations has this Court allowed outright sei-
zure without opportunity for a prior hearing. First, in each
case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an
important governmental or general public interest. Sec-
ond, there has been a special need for very prompt action.
Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly
189. Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498 (1932).
190. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
191. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
192. Id. at 84.
193. 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
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of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has
been a government official responsible for determining,
under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it
was necessary and justified in the particular instance.
Thus, the Court has allowed summary seizure of property
to collect the internal revenue of the United States [citing
Phillips], to meet the needs of a national war effort, to
protect against the economic disaster of a bank failure, and
to protect the public from misbranded drugs and contami-
nated food.
194
There are reasons for the Court to reconsider the proposition
that all internal revenue actions must be beyond the constitutional
requirements of prior judicial review, particularly in jeopardy situ-
ations. There is great ambiguity about the scope of the authority
created by the jeopardy and termination provisions. Despite the
differences in the language used in sections 6851 and 6861, the
Service itself has instructed its employees in using the termination
authority that "the criteria and procedure related to jeopardy assess-
ments should be followed."' 95 The differences in the conditions for
exercising the two vast power sources have apparently been ignored
rather than addressed and determined by the agency in which the
extraordinary powers are vested.
In Hall and Laing, the internal revenue mechanism has been used,
at least in part, as an internal crime busting mechanism. The Court
has never sanctioned summary proceedings against criminal defen-
dants. In fact, the Court in Fuentes noted and carefully distin-
guished a governmental taking authorized for tax collection pur-
poses from a seizure of possessions pursuant to search warrants is-
sued only after a showing of probable cause.
19 6
Finally, the aged proposition that every individual attempt to
gather public revenue constitutes an extraordinary circumstance is
itself susceptible to serious question. The ancient origins of this
doctrine have been tested and found failing in other cases. 197 Its
survival may derive in part from a concern with the allocation of
powers among the branches of government. The judiciary should
not be placed in a position to undermine the "very existence of the
government" by enjoining its tax collectors. 98
But the question posed by these particular cases is not whether
courts can stop the government from collecting taxes. The normal
194. 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972).
195. Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Manual § 5213.3(1) (Nov. 25, 1974).
196. 407 U.S. at 93 n.30. See also Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1974);
Willits v. Richardson, 497 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1974).
197. Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498 (1932).
198. Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85, 89 (1875).
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tax collection mechanisms are not here in issue. The question is
whether the Service is saved from judicial inquiry where it chooses
to exercise special collection powers in a relatively few instances
where the consequences of the actions upon the taxpayers af-
fected may be peculiarly harsh. The peculiar circumstances in which
the special powers are exercisable could be recognized and the broad
jeopardy exemption of revenue collection activities reconsidered
without measurably affecting the overall efficiency of the tax collec-
tion mechanism.' 99
A determination requiring judicial review in all jeopardy and
termination cases would constitute a substantial departure from the
tenor of past tax collection decisions despite the serious questions
raised by the unavailability of judicial review in jeopardy situations
and recent recognition by the Court of the shortcomings of seizures
and levies without notice and review. However, the Sniadach and
Fuentes analyses might reasonably justify the conclusion that
equitable relief is always appropriate where termination or jeopardy
assessment powers have been exercised.20 0
There would still remain the second requirement for injunctive
relief established in Williams Packing. Even though equitable re-
lief is appropriate, an injunction should not issue unless it is clear
that the Service can not ultimately prevail "under the most liberal
view of the law and facts. 2 0 ' The simplicity of that formulation
conceals substantial ambiguity about the practical application of
the doctrine.
XV. THE PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING THAT THE
SERVICE CANNOT PREVAIL
In Shapiro the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has endeavored to apply the second element of the doctrine estab-
lished in Williams Packing. In remanding the Shapiro case, the
court of appeals directed the district court to hear evidence with re-
spect to the facts upon which the Service had made its jeopardy
assessment. The court of appeals assumed that the taxpayer would
deny the facts alleged by the Service and allege that the claim was
arbitrary and excessive even though such denial and allegations
199. See Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108, 126 (5th Cir. 1974).
200. Once the district court has granted such equitable relief on the grounds that
the Service could not ultimately prevail, the underlying rationale of Sniadach and
Fuentes supports an appellate court's refusal to reexamine this determination.
Therefore, if the district court grants injunctive relief, Sniadach and Fuentes can rea-
sonably be argued to prevent reversal on appeal.
201. 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
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could not be found in the pleadings. °2 The Service contends that
there is no reason for hearing further evidence once the fact of the
jeopardy assessment is proved. Section 6861(a) provides for jeopardy
assessments where the requisite "belief' is held by the Service em-
ployee. There is, accordingly, no basis for looking behind the fact of
the existence of that belief.20 3  But the taxpayer contends that the
Service's belief is erroneous. In Shapiro, the Supreme Court is
then being asked to allocate the burdens for applying the Williams
Packing test in jeopardy-assessment situations.
The Service cites many cases in which courts have refrained from
inquiring into the process by which administrative discretion has
been exercised. The Service contends that, barring such circum-
stances as fraud, these authorities prohibit judicial review of the
grounds upon which a jeopardy assessment is made. The District
of Columbia Circuit would permit the trial court to require proof
by the Service to substantiate the jeopardy assessment.0 4 If such
proof is not satisfactory, the district court can set aside the jeopardy
assessment and, accordingly, enjoin any collection action in respect
thereof.
20 5
Lower courts have had great difficulty in applying this portion of
the Williams Packing standard. The major difficulty lies in respond-
ing to a Service assertion that the taxes are due. If the assertion
is made in reasonably good faith, the Service will prevail unless
the court looks to the factual basis of the assertion. Since the
possibility of providing injunctive relief was specifically recognized
in Williams Packing, that decision might be read as a mandate to a
trial court to inquire into the bases for the Service's conclusions.
But there is also strong language ih the Williams Packing decision
suggesting that the Commissioner's good faith assertion of liability
is enough: "To require more than good faith on the part of the
Government would unduly interfere with a collateral objective of the
Act-protection of the collector from litigation pending a suit for re-
fund. 20 6  The Service is relying heavily upon that language to
202. 499 F.2d at 533. The denial of dealings in narcotics and allegations that the
Internal Revenue Service's claim was arbitrary and excessive were not in the pleadings
because Shapiro filed his complaint prior to the Service's revealing the basis and
amount of the claim against him.
203. The court of appeals asserted that the mere "protestations of good faith and
conclusory statements of plaintiffs tax liability" were inadequate to establish the gov-
ernment's burden of establishing a good faith belief. Id. at 535, quoting Mansky v.
Fitzgerald, 297 F. Supp. 943, 946 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
204. The district court was directed to obtain some evidence to insure the asserted
deficiency was not "an exaction in the guise of a tax." 499 F.2d at 535.
205. Id. at 536.
206. Enoch v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
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overturn the decision of the court of appeals in Shapiro.
Courts of appeals in several circuits have heretofore indicated a
willingness to require the Service to provide factual support for its
collection activities. In other cases, courts of appeals have upheld
the propriety of injunctive relief against collection activities because
the facts upon which the Service's actions had purportedly been
based did not adequately support the actions in question.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has at least twice
supported injunctive relief against collection activities. In Bauer v.
Foley, °7 a deficiency notice was mailed to the taxpayer after which
a notice of lien was filed and her home seized. The district court
ruled that injunctive relief was impermissible.0 s The court of ap-
peals reversed and directed the trial court to determine whether the
taxpayer's signature had been forged by her husband on a joint
return as the taxpayer had alleged:
If the trial court on remand finds that the signature of the
taxpayer was forged on any of the tax returns in question
or that the signature was placed on the return under du-
ress, then such return cannot be treated as a joint return
for the purposes of the statutes. Under such circumstances
the Government could not under the most liberal view of
law and the facts establish its claim that the taxpayer was
properly subject to a deficiency assessment based on that
return.
The court of appeals contemplated the submission of evidence
to determine at least one element of the validity of the Service's
action. It was not enough for the Service to state that it honestly
believed that it was the taxpayer's signature and that there was no
duress involved in her signing the return.
Pizzarello v. United States2 ° arose out of an alleged gambling
tax deficiency. The taxpayer had been convicted for illegal
gambling activities, but his conviction was reversed on fifth amend-
ment grounds. 211 Just prior to the implementation of a court order
requiring the return to the taxpayer of monies that had been con-
fiscated in a raid on his store, the Service sent a "Statement of Tax
Due" declaring a jeopardy assessment in the amount of $282,440.70.
The claim was said to be based upon an "audit of Pizzarello's tax
return for the period shown. 2  But no tax return had been filed.
207. 287 F. Supp. 343 (W.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 404 F.2d 1215 (2d Cir. 1968).
208. Id. at 346.
209. 404 F.2d 1215, 1221 (2d Cir. 1968).
210. 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1969).
211. Seeid. at581.
212. Id. at 582.
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The taxpayer at once brought suit to enjoin the anticipated levy.
The district court dismissed the case on the ground that a remedy
at law was available.213 The court of appeals concluded, however,
that the Service could not ultimately prevail and remanded the case
to the district court for a hearing on the propriety of injunctive re-
lief.2
14
The Second Circuit decision in Pizzarello constitutes the most
energetic effort undertaken by any court of appeals to grapple with
the difficult procedural questions arising out of the Williams Packing
doctrine. After accepting the absolute language of the Supreme
Court in Williams Packing establishing the "no circumstances rule,"
the court put that rule into procedural perspective:
We begin with the assumption that a tax assessment is
presumptively valid and that the burden is on the taxpayer
to prove its invalidity . . . Such a presumption is not
evidence itself and disappears upon the introduction of
evidence to overcome it.1
5
Although the taxpayer had not kept the required records, the Sec-
ond Circuit reviewed the facts upon which the Service's assess-
ment had been based and concluded that the assessment was "ex-
cessive, arbitrary and without factual foundation.,
21 6
The principal defect in the Service's position lay in its method of
estimating the amount of wagering upon which the tax would be
applied. A Service employee applied the average amount of wages
from a three-day period in April, 1972, to a five-year period, thus
assuming that the same amount of wagering activity had been un-
dertaken during the entire period.2 7 The court noted the absence of
evidence in the record that gambling activities had existed during
the entire five-year period or that the three-day average was repre-
sentative of the entire period. It held that "[n]o court could prop-
erly make such inferences without some foundation of fact.21 8
Governmental references to decisions sustaining the validity of esti-
mating procedures were rejected because of the inadequacy of the
criteria upon which the estimates were based: "Because the District
Director made a totally excessive assessment, excessive because
based on entirely inadequate information, collection should be en-
213. Pizzarello v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 147, 151 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd and re-
manded, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1968).
214. 408 F.2d 579, 587 (2d Cir. 1968).
215. Id. at 583.
216. Id. at 586.
217. Id. at 583.
218. Id.
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joined, if equity jurisdiction otherwise exists., 219 The court also took
the occasion to reject the Service's use of evidence already held to
be inadmissible, because it was obtained by illegal search and sei-
zure.
220
The Fifth Circuit has also sustained the propriety of injunctive
relief in two cases where it found that the Service could not prevail.
Lucia v. United States,22' also involved an alleged gambling tax
liability. The taxpayer had sought to enjoin collection activities
after a jeopardy assessment had been made for failing to file wager-
ing tax returns. The district court dismissed the action on the basis
of section 7421,222 but the court of appeals reversed and remanded
for consideration of the taxpayer's allegation that the assessment
was arbitrary, capricious, and without factual foundation. In reach-
ing its decision, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, adopted the analy-
sis of the Second Circuit in Pizzarello.223 After noting that pro-
jection methods for determining wagering income were in wide dis-
pute, the court endeavored to explain its holding in light of the
Williams Packing criteria:
We do not regard this decision as conflicting with the
line of cases holding that injunctive relief will be denied if
it appears that the Government can make at least some
recovery of the tax assessed. More fundamental consider-
ations concern us here than a mere quarrel over the amount
of the tax . . . . Only after exploring all relevant consid-
erations on remand will the District Court be able to deter-
mine whether the computative basis is so insufficient as to
make the assessment an exaction in "the guise of a tax"
rather than a legitimate tax on wagers.224
Again, the simple assertion of good faith on the part of the assess-
ing tax collector was not in itself sufficient to carry the day.
In Aguilar v. United States,225 the Fifth Circuit reversed a dis-
trict court order dismissing an action to enjoin collection activities
pursuant to a termination action. The court noted that the tax of
$12,744.00, imposed against a nonresident alien who had sent a
truck from Mexico into the United States with some employees and
some cash to pay for truck repairs, was almost exactly equal to the
sum of the cash and the value of the truck. Moreover, the court
219. Id. at 584.
220. Id. at 586.
221. 474 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1973).
222. (Unreported district court opinion).
223. 474 F.2d at 573.
224. Id. at 575.
225. 501 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1974).
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concluded that the Service's action was consistent with a pattern of
behavior which was part of the national drug enforcement campaign.
As a result, the action of the Service was held to be potentially arbi-
trary and a hearing was ordered.226 The Aquilar court clearly ques-
tioned the good faith asserted by the Service:
On the face of the record . . . a non-resident alien who
has no income from any sources in the United States whose
truck and money are geographically within the United
States for the purpose of purchasing legitimate commer-
cial supplies, has money and truck taken peremptorily
from him at the instance of drug law enforcers with no
more than a vague suggestion that the Government "sus-
pected" that these strangers were trafficking in drugs. Adding
to the mystery of the basis for that "suspicion" is the total
-the word is total-lack of any basis for computing the quick
terminated tax to be $12,774.00-almost the precise total of
the money and the value of the truck-a pattern followed of-
ten in the contemporary practice where tax mechanisms
are employed "not as tax collection devices but as summary
punishment to supplement or complement regular criminal
procedures. 227
The good faith asserted by the Service was again not of itself suf-
ficient to avoid an inquiry into the bases for the actions taken.
Denials of injunctive relief have been affirmed or required in a
number of court of appeals decisions. In one case the relief was
denied because the court declined to certify an act as a class action
after the Service admitted that it could not prevail against the pain-
tiff, having assessed a tax for the wrong taxable year.228 In another
the court reversed a district court order granting injunctive relief
based upon a ruling that the district director's action had not been
properly authorized. 2 29 The proof of nonauthorization had been as-
serted for the first time in post-hearing brief. The court held that
the untimely assertion was insufficient evidence upon which to find
that the Service could not prevail. In several cases courts of ap-
peals have affirmed denials of injunctive relief where the plaintiff had
failed to show that the Service could not prevail.230 In none of these
226. Id. at 130. In addition, the Service was held to be required to provide a de-
ficiency notice even though section 6851 powers were being used in the collection ac-
tion. See Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1974). Campbell was decided the
same day as Aguilar and held that a deficiency notice was required in section 6851 pro-
ceedings.
227. 501 F.2d at 130-31.
228. Lewis v. Sandler, 498 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1974).
229. Thornton v. United States, 493 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1974).
230. James v. United States, 510 F.2d 860 (6th Cir. 1975); Trent v. United States,
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cases, however, was the assertion of good faith by the Service
deemed adequate in itself to avoid injunctive relief. Only the Sev-
enth Circuit seems to have accepted the Service's assertion of good
faith as an automatic bar to injunctive relief under Williams Pack-
231ing. In Durovic v. Commissioner, the court noted that:
This Circuit has previously held that this discretionary
power [to issue jeopardy assessments] is not subject to ju-
dicial review. . . . We have heretofore noted that "jeop-
ardy assessments are of their nature and purpose arbi-
trary." Thus, while we might think the continuing jeop-
ardy assessment, while perhaps originally reasonable, is
presently unfair and unreasonable (and we do), we are
without power to act.
212
The court did not, however, conclude that the unfairness and unrea-
sonability of the Service's actions meant that it could not prevail
"under any circumstances."
Although somewhat ambiguous, the Seventh Circuit seems to
have adopted the view, at least in jeopardy situations, that the
simple assertion by the Service that it is acting in good faith is suf-
ficient to withstand successfully an attempt to enjoin collection activ-
ity. Such a view appears to be the opposite of the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit which in Shapiro ordered the Service to provide
substantiation for its jeopardy assessment on the basis of an implied
allegation by the taxpayer that the Service was in error. The Su-
preme Court would seem to have several basic options for dealing
with the challenges to the absolute prohibition of injunctions against
collections in jeopardy situations. It could adopt the view that an
assertion of good faith on the part of the Service will suffice to cause
dismissal of a taxpayer's suit for an injunction against jeopardy ac-
tions. Although the Service in one case admitted that it has assessed
taxes for the wrong year and that, therefore, it could not prevail,
it is unlikely that admissions of error, let alone bad faith, are likely
to be frequent. The result might be, therefore, that injunctive
relief is only available when the Service admits that it is prepared to
settle the case. In effect this option would provide no prior review
of the jeopardy action.
Alternately, the Court could require a taxpayer to prove that
the Service could not ultimately prevail to any extent, no matter
what theory the Service might secretly covet for its actions. Such a
442 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1971); Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir. 1971); Hamilton
v. United States, 429 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1970).
231. 487 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1973).
232. Id. at 40.
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burden would limit substantially the effective availability of judicial
review, but would provide some relief for any who could prove that no
taxes were owed.
A third possibility is presented by the court of appeals decision
in Shapiro. If the taxpayer alleges that the Service has erred, the
Service would be required to adduce evidence upon which its jeop-
ardy assessment was based.
It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would at this time ef-
fectively remove jeopardy assessments from the Williams Packing
doctrine. It also seems unlikely that the Court would either require
taxpayers to prove defenses to unstated charges or the Service to
prove its position against mere allegations of error. The courts in
Pizzarello233 and Lucia23 4 appear to have found a method for apply-
ing the Williams Packing tests which could be employed in respect
of jeopardy actions without unduly encumbering the collection pro-
cess: since the Service knows the facts upon which its actions are
based; the Service is required to disclose those facts where tax-
payers offer proof that the assessment is erroneous; unless the Ser-
vice can withstand a challenge in a context similar to that of a mo-
tion for summary judgment, the injunctive relief may be granted if
grounds justifying equitable relief are demonstrated.23 5 If this ap-
proach is adopted, the Service would have to show the facts upon
which its assessment was based as well as the facts that have cre-
ated the belief that tax collection would be jeopardized by delay.
Since the trial court would ordinarily assume the truth of the Gov-
ernment's evidence and make any reasonable inference in favor of the
Government, the Service would be "stopped in its tracks" only in
such situations where its activities were clearly unjustifiable.
XVI. SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN APPLYING THE WILLIAMS PACKING
DOCTRINE TO TERMINATION ACTIONS
Unless the Supreme Court determines that the Service's expres-
sion of good faith is sufficient to defeat a suit to enjoin jeopardy
collections, several problems arise which are peculiar to the ter-
mination provisions of section 6851. The taxpayers in Hall and
Laing could argue that the Williams Packing analysis is inapplicable
if the Court determined that Tax Court review is unavailable in
respect of termination actions. The Williams Packing decision spe-
cifically noted that relatively speedy Tax Court review was available.
233. Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1969).
234. Lucia v. United States, 474 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1973).
235. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
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The Court, however, also went out of its way in Williams Packing
to indicate that the availability of Tax Court review was a matter
of legislative grace rather than a constitutional mandate. There is
nothing in the Court's later opinions suggesting that it is prepared
at this time to make the constitutionality of distraint powers depen-
dent upon Tax Court reviewability.
The Service in Laing and Hall could argue that, even if evidence
must be shown to support a jeopardy assessment, the language of
section 6851(a) specifically prohibits inquiry into the adequacy of
the bases for the Commissioneres findings in a termination action.
The section provides that "[i]n any proceeding in court brought to en-
force payment of taxes made due and payable by virtue of the pro-
visions of this section, the finding of the Secretary or his delegate,
made as herein provided, whether made after notice to the taxpayer
or not, shall be for all purposes presumptive evidence of jeopardy. 2 36
There are several reasons why this presumption would not appear
to prohibit inquiry into the Commissioner's termination finding.
The provision by its terms applies only in a collection suit where the
government, as plaintiff, would normally bear the burden of proof.
Secondly, the presumption applies only to the "jeopardy." Other
aspects of the Commissioner's findings are not included in the statu-
tory presumption. There is, for example, no presumption as to the
existence of a "design."
The factual differences in the Laing and Hall cases demonstrate
the ambiguities inherent in the finding of a "design." The Laing
case falls quite clearly within the framework of cases about which,
according to the early legislative history, the Congress was particu-
larly concerned.2 37  The taxpayer was about to leave the country.
There was evidence that a great deal of money was being taken with
him. Although it may be difficult to determine how the Service
could reach the conclusion that all three travelers were liable for
taxes on the same item of potential income, Laing is the classic case
of the departing alien.
Hall is completely different. A husband is arrested in Texas, so
a wife suffers a termination action in Kentucky. There is no evi-
dence of a "design" on the part of the taxpayer to do anything.
The inference of the Service employee is based upon the husband's
conviction and the discovery in the wife's home of an unspecified
quantity of marijuana, and prompted by directions from Washington
to crack down on drug dealers.238
236. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6851(a).
237. Note 67 supra.
238. Note 89 supra.
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The government might contend that these factual differences have
no legal significance. Laing had designed to leave the country and
to remove his assets therefrom. Hall had designed to do "any
other act." The Commissioner has "found" that both "designs"
are for the prohibited objective. Accordingly, termination powers
may be exercised in both cases.
Hall has an argument that does not apply in the Laing situation.
Since the enactment of the termination provisions in 1918, certain
"designs" have been specifically included in the statute: leaving the
country or hiding in it; transporting assets out of the country or hid-
ing assets in it. The catchall phrase "any other act" has also been
used since 1918 to identify odious designs that may trigger termina-
tion action. It would appear, however, that the term "any other act"
cannot be interpreted literally.
A literal interpretation would lead to the conclusion that any
taxpayer anywhere at any time could be subjected to termination ac-
tion as soon as income was received as long as the Service employee
"finds" that collection was at risk. If such a literal interpretation
obtained, there would be no reason to enumerate specifically any
particular type of design; but specific acts have always been cited.
In 1939 another specific act was added. Section 6851(a)(2) was
added to provide for termination actions in respect to certain corpo-
rations in liquidations. 239 There is nothing in section 6851(a)(2) that
could be outside of the term "design . . . to do any other act."
The reason for clarification must have been, therefore, to assure that
the specified actions were clearly recognized as potential occasions
for termination actions. The necessary inference is that not all acts
constitute a valid basis for termination.
Congress has not defined generally the "other acts" in respect
to which terminations could be made and the "other acts" which
would not give rise to such powers. There is no indication in the
legislative history of any meaning for that term. Commentators
writing just after the termination provisions were initially enacted
239. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6851(a) (2):
If the Secretary or his delegate finds that the collection of the income tax
of a corporation for the current or the preceding taxable year will be jeopar-
dized by the distribution of all or a portion of the assets of such corporation
in the liquidation of the whole or any part of its capital stock, the Secretary
or his delegate shall declare the taxable period for such taxpayer immediately
terminated and shall cause notice of such finding and declaration to be giv-
en the taxpayer, together with a demand for immediate payment of the tax
for the taxable period so declared terminated and of the tax for the preceding
taxable year or so much of such tax as is unpaid, whether or not the time oth-
erwise allowed by law for filing return and paying the tax has expired; and
such taxes shall thereupon become immediately due and payable.
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were not sure about its full meaning.240 There appears to have been
a belief that it was directed at tax evasion.24' If so, the question
may be whether a taxpayer not possessing one of the "designs"
described in the statute is a potential tax evader. There is nothing
in the proceedings to suggest that Hall specifically intended to evade
taxes.
The Service might respond that it is not required to find poten-
tial evasion before exercising the termination authority. Such a
response would be supported by the absence of any reference to
"6evasion" in section 6851. It might be noted in this respect, how-
ever, that neither the Treasury Regulations nor the Internal Revenue
Manual makes any attempt to define the "other acts" whose design
may lead to the invocation of termination authority.
The Service might assert that evidence of narcotics dealing alone
is sufficient to support an inference that the taxpayer intends to do
"this act" which justifies termination. There is at least one in-
stance in which the Government sought to rely solely upon its suspi-
cions of participation in narcotics trafficking to justify a termination
action. In Willitts v. Richardson, the district court had dismissed a
suit to enjoin the collection actions, but the Fifth Circuit reversed
the dismissal and ordered the district court to grant the injunction.242
Although analyzing in detail the rather scant evidence of the tax-
payer's participation in the narcotics trade, the court discussed the
Narcotics Project:
The IRS has been given broad power to take possession
of the property of citizens by summary means that ignore
many basic tenets of pre-seizure due process in order to pre-
vent the loss of tax revenues. Courts cannot allow these
expedients to be turned on citizens suspected of wrong-
doing-not as collection devices but as summary punish-
ment to supplement or complement regular criminal pro-
cedures. The fact that they are cloaked in the garb of tax
240. In G. HOLMEs, FEDERAL INCOME AND PROFITS TAXES (1919), the "expla-
nation" of the termination provision consists in its entirety of a presentation of the text
of the statute in paragraph form, accompanied by the following explanation:
Under this provision it seems to be within the power of the Commissioner to
declare the taxable period of a corporation terminated at the end of the calen-
dar month preceding the month in which it is dissolved and to demand imme-
diate payment of the tax for such taxable period and the tax for the preceding
year or to require security for the payment thereof.
In another text of that period, the discussion of collection powers contains no reference
to the termination provision. KIXMILLER & BAAR, 1922 UNITED STATES INCOME
AND WAR TAX GUIDE 318 (1921).
241. R. MONTGOMERY, INCOME TAX PROCEDURE 241 (1923). Such a belief is
also reflected in the justification for the provision offered in the Senate during a 1921
debate. See 61 CONG. REC. 6112 (1921).
242. 497 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1974).
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collection and applied only by the Narcotics Project to
those believed to be engaged in or associated with the nar-
cotics trade must not bootstrap judicial approval of such
use.
24 3
If the Williams Packing analysis is to have any impact in termi-
nation situations, it should at least be employed to ascertain whether
a "design" exists and whether it is directed to the doing of an act
which could arguably prejudice the collection process or render it
partly or wholly ineffective. The use of the termination powers in
Narcotics Enforcement Program raises special problems in this re-
spect. No effort appears to have been made specifically to consider
the question of tax evasion beyond the assumption that tax eva-
sion follows drug trafficking. But the program was intended pri-
marily to stop drug traffic, while the Anti-Injunction Act applies to
actions to enjoin tax collections. The Service steadfastly resists
any attempt to explore its motives. But where extraordinary powers
are being exercised and the Service itself has disclosed information
inviting suspicion that its motivation lies outside of tax collection,
judicial inquiry might not be beyond the real purposes of section
7421.244
XVII. LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF THE JEOPARDY POWERS
TO PROVIDE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Whether the Supreme Court determines that termination actions
must include an opportunity for the taxpayer to seek Tax Court
review and whatever the Court should decide about the manner in
which the Anti-Injunction Act applies in termination actions and
jeopardy assessments, proposals to modify the jeopardy-collection
scheme will be placed before the Congress. If the Court decides
that judicial review is very restricted, supporters of legislative
amendments to provide review will increase their efforts.
Congressional committees have, during the past several years, re-
ceived reports of jeopardy and termination "horror stories" in which
individuals and businesses were ruined by distraint proceedings. 5
243. Id. at 246.
244. The opinions in Bob Jones University and "Americans United," Inc. suggest,
understandably, that the Court does not wish to invite litigation with respect to the
motives of the Service or the revenue consequences in every injunction proceeding.
Such an inclination derives directly from an assumption that the Internal Revenue
Service is the federal tax collection agency, and that section 7421 was adopted to allow
the Service to perform that function. When the Service becomes an agency for the
summary enforcement of criminal laws, however, the validity of the assamption must
be questioned.
245. See generally Hearings Before the Oversight Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); Hearings on Internal
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These reports have been accompanied by suggestions that judicial
review of jeopardy powers be provided.246 Most of the suggestions
would provide some avenue for immediate review by the district
court of jeopardy assessments and termination actions to assure
that the criteria for their usage have been satisfied.247 Such sug-
gestions are not solely of recent vintage. Proposals for judicial re-
view, citing instances of abuse, were made more than two decades
ago.248 The Committee on Taxation of the American Bar Associa-
tion as far back as 1958 recommended that judicial review be pro-
vided in jeopardy situations249 and has continued to campaign for
such review until the present time.
Representatives of the Internal Revenue Service have been un-
enthusiastic about proposals to limit its power or to impose time-
consuming levels of review.250 Such a response is not surprising;
one must expect an organization to be convinced that its internal
mechanisms will prevent abuse. And the Service frequently notes
that the number of legitimate complaints are minute compared to the
amount of public revenues collected.25 ' Moreover, the Service is al-
ways eager to assert the need for power to assure "voluntary com-
pliance." The occasional error, it is argued, is more than justified
by the deterrent effect of the existence of the summary powers.
One answer to the foregoing is that voluntary compliance is also
fostered by the public's belief in the fairness and equity of the tax
structure. The occasional abuse may have a more adverse affect up-
on voluntary compliance than would result from the opportunity
for judicial review. 252 Of course, such a proposition is not provable,
but neither is the view asserted by the Service.
Revenue Appropriations Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 93d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 570, 571, 630, 642-43 (1974).
246. See, e.g., S. 137, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
247. S. 137 would, for example, provide for district court review of jeopardy assess-
ment actions within five days after a request for such hearing is filed by the taxpayer.
248. See, e.g., Gould, Jeopardy Assessment: When They May Be Levied and
What To Do About Them in N.Y.U. INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 937 (1960);
Kaminski, Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Jeopardy Assessments Under
the Internal Revenue Code, 14 TAX L. Rev. 545 (1959).
249. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 221 (1958). The Com-
mittee on Taxation has continued to support proposals for judicial review.
250. See, e.g., Testimony of Commissioner Alexander, Hearings on Internal Rev-
enue Service Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 93d Cong., Ist Sess.
611 (1974).
251. 113 CONG. REC., 22497 (1967).
252. See, e.g., Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade
111, 77 YALE L.J. 1104, 1131 (1968). See also statement of Commissioner Donald C.
Alexander in Taxes on Parade, CCH 1974 STAND. FED. TAX REP., no. 40, at 2.
1976]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
One element of the unfairness of an erroneous or unjustified
collection action is the generally acknowledged fact that, despite
the language of the Supreme Court in Williams Packing, it is not
necessarily true that the possibility of an eventual refund suit pro-
vides adequate relief If all of the taxpayer's assets are seized, for
example, his ability to secure legal assistance may be impaired.
If the taxpayer turns out to have been correct, his assets are re-
turned and statutory interest is paid. Non-cash assets will, however,
probably have been sold in a distress sale. In such a case the tax-
payer is entitled to recover only the proceeds of the sale, an amount
unlikely to equal the real value of the assets to the taxpayer.253
No damages are available from the Service or from the Service
employee in the event that a wrongful collection action has been
taken. 54 The cost of preserving this element of the tax collection
mechanism is, therefore, placed squarely on those unlucky few
against whom a wrongful action is directed. Neither the Service
nor the Congress has shown any disposition to provide damages to
the victims of wrongful actions. There is an overwhelming concern
that provision for possible damages would create an expanse of liti-
gation that would seriously impede the tax collection function. As
long as this view is maintained, the provision of prior review in
jeopardy and termination situations would seem to be an appropriate
way to retain the special jeopardy powers while minimizing the cost
to those who must bear it.
XVIII. CONCLUSION
Despite the criticism of judges, practitioners and scholars, the
Service insists upon the necessity of using the termination and
jeopardy assessment powers. The great efficiency of the collection
devices, the Service argues, would be impaired by the availability of
prior judicial review.
But the Treasury is not defenseless without these collection de-
vices. The government may use civil penalties and criminal sanc-
tions against delinquent taxpayers. It has a superpriority over most
other creditors who lay claim to a taxpayer's assets. It may use the
courts, like other creditors, to collect debts, or, unlike other credi-
tors, it may wield its mighty powers of distraint.
The lack of discretion in the exercise of discretionary powers
has invited litigation and invites legislation. It may be timely for
Congress to consider, not only the narrow questions of prior review
253. Note 41 supra.
254. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1970).
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for termination actions and jeopardy assessments, but the extent to
which such powers should properly exist and the circumstances
within which their "atomic potential" can be mustered against a
taxpayer.
